

**ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS UNIT**

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

TO: Greg Lauchner, Inspector General

FROM: Ernest Barragan, Investigator, Administrative Investigations Unit
Russ Brodner, Investigator, Administrative Investigations Unit

DATE: August 30, 2010

SUBJECT: Investigative Report 2010-1033

SYNOPSIS

On July 30, 2010, inmates Tracy Province ADC 071253, John McCluskey ADC 074469, and Daniel Renwick ADC 164446 escaped from ASP- Kingman, a private prison contracted with the Arizona Department of Corrections. The three inmates cut through the perimeter fence with wire cutters provided by an outside accomplice waiting for the three inmates outside the perimeter fence.

Inmate Renwick was recaptured in Colorado on August 01, 2010, Inmate Tracy Province was recaptured in Meeteetse, Wyoming on August 09, 2010, and I/M McCluskey was taken into custody by the Mojave County Sheriff's Office on August 19, 2010, along with his female accomplice Casslyn Welch.

Per Department Order 707.07, ESCAPE INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW (**Addendum A**); an Administrative Investigation is automatically initiated.

INVESTIGATIVE LEADS

STAFF:

Division Director, Robert Patton	EIN [REDACTED]	-	Witness
Operation Director Contract Beds, Wade Woolsey	EIN [REDACTED]	-	Witness
Acting Operations Director Contract Beds, Joe Profiri	EIN [REDACTED]	-	Witness
ADW David Lee	EIN [REDACTED]	-	Witness
Captain, Jeri Green	EIN [REDACTED]	-	Witness
CO III Melissa Anderson	EIN [REDACTED]	-	Witness
ADC Engineer, Ralph Mellecher	EIN [REDACTED]	-	Witness

INMATES:

Tracy Province	ADC # 071253	-	Escapee
John McCluskey	ADC # 074469	-	Escapee
Daniel Renwick	ADC # 164446	-	Escapee

MTC STAFF

ADW Richard Ramsey	-	Witness
Lieutenant, Sherri Ogle	-	Witness
Lieutenant David Heppler	-	Witness
Sergeant, Ricky Bussart	-	Witness
Officer Bernard Weaver	-	Witness
Officer Christopher Day	-	Witness
Officer Phillip Shannon	-	Witness
Officer Scott Henry	-	Witness
Officer Christopher Gould	-	Witness
Officer David Ward	-	Witness
Officer Ruth Anzalone	-	Witness
Officer Richard Riley	-	Witness
Officer John Palmer	-	Witness
Officer Sherice Honce	-	Witness
Officer Joseph Esquiville	-	Witness
Physical Plant Supervisor, Jim Packer	-	Witness

NARRATIVE

On July 30, 2010, ADC Executive Report (**Addendum B**) listed three inmates assigned to ASP-Kingman escaped from the secured perimeter of the institution. In addition, SIR 201006913 (**Addendum C**) was initiated via ADC Central Communications documenting the above reference incident. The inmate's personal characteristics to include Height, Weight, Eye Color etc, were printed out from AIMS (**Addendum D**).

I/M Province's current incarceration with ADC began on January 29, 1993, for 1st Degree Murder, and Robbery out of Pima County with a sentence of life. Previous incarcerations included Trafficking stolen property with a sentence of 5 years, and Burglary with a sentence of 4 years. A complete AIMS print out of I/M Province's conviction record is provided in this report (**Addendum E**).

I/M Province's initial classification was completed at Central Unit on February 01, 1993, with a score of 5/3. At the time of his escape, I/M Province's score was a 3/3 with a total custody score of 39, which enabled him to be housed in a medium security facility. A complete list of I/M Province's classification is provided in this report (**Addendum F**).

I/M Province's movement for his current incarceration in ADC included placement in the following prisons: ASPC-Florence, ASPC-Winslow, ASPC-Douglas, and ASP-Kingman. A complete AIMS print out of I/M Province's movement while incarcerated in ADC is provided in this report (**Addendum G**).

From I/M Province's current incarceration until his escape, he was found guilty of 12 separate disciplinary violations including, *narcotics possession, disobeying orders, conspiracy to commit, and positive or refused urinalysis*. I/M Province's most recent disciplinary violation occurred on May 29, 2009, where he was found guilty for positive or refused urinalysis. A complete list of I/M Province's Discipline record is provided in this report (**Addendum H**).

I/M McCluskey's current incarceration with ADC began on July 17, 2009, for Discharging a Firearm, Aggravated Assault, and Attempt to Commit 2nd Degree Murder out of Maricopa County with a sentence of 15 years for each charge. I/M McCluskey had one previous incarceration for a DWI while on a suspended license, with a sentence of 1 year in July of 1989. A complete AIMS print out of I/M McCluskey's Criminal Record is provided in this report (**Addendum I**).

I/M McCluskey's initial classification was completed at ASPC-Phoenix, Alhambra Unit on July 21, 2009, with a score of 3/3. At the time of his escape, I/M McCluskey's score was a 3/3 with a total custody score of 24, which enabled him to be housed in a medium security facility. A complete list of I/M McCluskey's classification is provided in this report (**Addendum J**).

I/M McCluskey's movement for his current incarceration in ADC included placement in the following prisons ASPC-Phoenix, ASPC-Lewis, and ASP-Kingman. A complete AIMS print out of I/M McCluskey's movement while incarcerated in ADC is provided in this report (**Addendum K**).

The only disciplinary violations found for I/M McCluskey were from previous incarcerations. A complete list is provided in this report (**Addendum L**).

At the time of his escape, I/M Renwick was a first time offender with ADC, and began his sentence on January 29, 1993, for two counts of 2nd Degree Murder out of Pima County with a sentence of 22 years for each count running consecutive. A complete list of I/M Renwick's Criminal Record is provided in this report (**Addendum M**).

I/M Renwick's initial classification was completed at ASPC-Phoenix on February 06, 2002, with a score of 5/3. At the time of his escape I/M Renwick's score was a 3/2 with a total custody score of 18, which enabled him to be housed in a medium security facility. A complete list of I/M Renwick's classification is provided in this report (**Addendum N**).

I/M Renwick's movement for his current incarceration in ADC included placement in the following prisons: ASPC-Phoenix, ASPC-Florence, ASPC-Tucson, ASPC-Lewis, and ASP-Kingman. A complete AIMS print out of I/M Renwick's movement while incarcerated in ADC is provided in this report (**Addendum O**).

I/M Renwick had no disciplinary violations prior to his escape on July 30, 2010, (**Addendum P**).

Under the classification system, no documentation is generated. All classifications and reclassifications are entered into AIMS, and the system (AIMS) calculates the custody and internal scores on each inmate. Ultimately, AIMS determines the custody level.

Each custody level is determined by a point system based on various criteria to include, *Gang Affiliation, Most Serious Current Offense, History of Discipline Violence and Program Performance*, points can be deducted from the total custody score.

The point breakdown is as follows:

- **60+ Maximum**
- **43-60 Close**
- **24-42 Medium**
- **0-23 Minimum**

Offender Services Bureau Administrator Stacy Crabtree provided the following information on the breakdown of how scores are taken into consideration for an overall score of inmates while housed in ADC. Seven areas of consideration are taken into account when determining an inmate's custody classification according to the Department Order 801 (**Addendum Q**) as denoted on AIMS DI99, section II, areas 1 thru 7.

Section 1 is entered by record staff taking into account the inmates most serious current offense.

Section 2 is entered by records staff taking into account the inmate's previous most serious offense.

Section 3 is entered by the CO III at the institution the inmate is housed at taking into account any escape history.

Section 4 is entered by the discipline hearing officer for any disciplinary against the inmate.

Section 5 is entered by the Security Threat Group area for any gang affiliations for the inmate.

Section 6 is entered by a CO III upon the inmate's initial entry into the department.

Section 7 is entered by a CO III in regards to an inmates programming.

The AIMS DI99 screen (**Addendum R**) shows the breakdown of each of the inmate's Custody and Internal Risk Classification according to the information provided by Offender Services Bureau Administrator Stacy Crabtree and the classification system.

On July 30, 2010, three inmates were discovered missing from ASP-Kingman during the 2115 hour formal count during the graveyard shift. Lt. Ogle submitted an Information Report 10-M-59-1276 (**Addendum S**) indicating Officer Henry called in his count at approximately 2130 hours, indicating he was missing 1 inmate from Dorm 2 identified as I/M Province # 164446 (2-C-27). I/M Province had been housed at ASP- Kingman since February 25, 2010.

Lt. Ogle wrote Officer Honse called in her count at approximately 2135 hours, indicating 2 inmates were missing from Dorm 1, identified as I/M Renwick # 164446 (1-B-05) housed at ASP-Kingman since April 20, 2010, and I/M McCluskey (1-D-27) housed at ASP- Kingman since February 23, 2010.

Lt. Ogle wrote she directed both officers to recount their pods, and sent Sgt. Bussart to assist with the recount in attempt to locate the missing inmates. At approximately 2140 hours, the officers from Dorm 1 and 2 called Lt. Ogle back and confirmed the inmates were in fact missing.

At approximately 2145 hours, Lt. Ogle directed several officers to begin checking the interior buildings within the institution to include the kitchen and office areas. In addition, Lt. Ogle made contact with perimeter officer Labbe directing him to conduct a thorough check of the perimeter fence.

Lt. Ogle wrote at approximately 2154 hours, she received information from Officer Hynick who reported no inmates were found in the kitchen, and from officer Labbe who reported the perimeter was secure. Lt. Ogle stated with the information provided, she initiated an ICS requesting an A/B response.

Lt. Ogle stated she enlisted the assistance of Lt. Kibbey and Sgt. Wilson from the CERBAT Unit to assist in making notifications and helping with searching the inner perimeter, and buildings.

Lt. Ogle wrote at approximately 2206 hours, Officer Labbe, assigned as the perimeter officer, contacted her via radio advising he discovered a breach in the fence between zones 9 and 10 with tools on the ground. Officer Labbe contacted Lt. Ogle again at 2213 hours, reporting a break in the barbed wire in the direction of I-40.

Lt. Ogle wrote she posted additional officers on the perimeter, and made notifications to Capt. Smith and Capt. Eyestone. An emergency count was conducted at 0128 hours, confirming inmates Renwick, McCluskey, and Province were missing, and a Code 200 (Inmate Escape) was confirmed.

Officer Labbe submitted an Information Report (**Addendum T**) indicating he was directed by Lt. Ogle to conduct a check of the perimeter. Officer Labbe wrote upon completing his check of the perimeter, he informed Lt. Ogle the perimeter was secure at approximately 2156 hours.

Officer Labbe wrote while conducting his perimeter check as directed by Lt. Ogle, he observed a vehicle on the perimeter described as a blue sedan with one female occupant.

Officer Labbe wrote he did not stop to identify the individual and completed his security check as directed. Officer Labbe wrote after calling in his check, he continued to patrol the perimeter at which time he saw the blue sedan in the area between the Cerbat unit on the perimeter road.

Officer Labbe wrote he made contact with the driver, who explained she was lost and needed directions to the interstate. Officer Labbe wrote he gave the female driver directions to the interstate and directed her to leave the area.

Officer Labbe wrote as he continued his patrol of the perimeter, he contacted Lt. Ogle at approximately 2206 hours, informing her of a breach in security with a hole in the fence line between zones 9 and 10.

Officer Labbe wrote with the assistance of the Mohave County Sheriff's Office, the driver of the blue sedan was identified as suspected accomplice Casslyn Welch.

Note: Information obtained during the investigation indicates the driver of the blue sedan in fact was not accomplice Casslyn Welch.

Officers Honse and Henry submitted information reports (**Addendum U**) indicating during their 2115 hour count three inmates were discovered missing. The officers identified the inmates as I/M Province from Dorm 2, and inmates Renwick and McCluskey from Dorm 1.

The Officers wrote Lt. Ogle immediately ordered a recount of the dorms, and sent Sgt. Bussart to Dorm 1 to assist with the recount of the Dorm 1. The officers wrote the inmates were confirmed to be missing, and notified Lt. Ogle.

The following day on July 31, 2010, the officers working Dorm 2 on July 30, 2010, (Swing shift), were asked to submit Information Reports (**Addendum V**) documenting the events during their shift on July 30, 2010. The officers were identified as Officers Palmer and Day. The officers indicated all three inmates were accounted during the 1600 hour count, and no unusual observations were made during the shift.

The Officers indicated the door exiting to the K-9 area from Dorm 2 does not set off an audible alarm in the control room when the door is opened. The only way an officer would know if the door was open is if the officers working the control room look at two or three other screens on the computer panel.

The officers indicated the door leading to the K-9 area is usually left on access mode allowing the inmates exit the unit during daytime hours without an officer escort of any kind, and at approximately 2030 hours the door is secured, and is only accessed by staff.

Note The officers indicated the inmates were allowed to prop the door open leading out to the K-9 area behind Dorm 2 using rocks to allow air circulation in the pod where the animals were kept during the daytime hours.

The Officers working Dorm 1 stated they were not asked to complete any documentation.

The officers working in Main Control on swing shift July 30, 2010, submitted Information reports

(Addendum W) and were identified as officers Ward and Weaver. Officer Ward indicated on July 30, 2010, the alarms were going off constantly, and were being reset as they went off.

Officer Ward indicated he was training Officer Weaver in Main Control, and explained the alarm system has been an ongoing problem at the Kingman facility for quite a long time.

Officer Ward was shown a copy of the alarm system print out **(Addendum X)** which shows the system was logged off for approximately 1 hour and 16 minutes at approximately 1908 hours, and the internal clock being 42 minutes fast regarding the time alarms are activated. Officer Ward gave no explanation as to why the alarm system was turned off, and claimed he did not, nor was he ever shown how to turn the alarm system off.

Note: Facilities Plant Manager Packer reported during his interview the alarm system can be manually turned off in the control room. This information is contradictory to the information provided by Officer Ward.

Staff indicated although the alarm system has several zones activating all the time, no work orders or notifications were made to the Administration or maintenance regarding the malfunctioning of the alarm system. One maintenance work order **(Addendum Y)** was found addressing issues with the perimeter alarm system, and or computer.

In the course of the investigation it was discovered the contract with the vendor for the alarm system had been cancelled approximately two years prior to the escape, and the last time the alarm system was checked was two years prior to the escape.

The count sheets for the Graveyard shift prior to the discovery of the inmates missing was obtained, and indicated all three inmates were accounted at 2330 hours, 0114 hours, and 0400 hours on July 29, 2010 **(Addendum Z)**.

The count sheet for Dayshift **(Addendum A1)** from 0500 hours to 1300 hours on July 30, 2010, indicates all three inmates were accounted at the 1100 hour count.

The count sheet **(Addendum B1)** utilized for the 1600 hour count and the 2115 hour count on July 30, 2010, indicates all three inmate were accounted at the 1600 count, and shows I/M Province was initially shown to be present at the 2115 hour count, but then is changed to being out. The officers indicated they accidentally placed an X for I/M Province being present when they should have put an O for being out.

The count sheet did not indicate if the count was ever cleared, however the next count sheet for Graveyard for July 31, 2010 **(Addendum C1)**, indicates a count was conducted at 0127 hours, and cleared at 0218 hours, showing O for the three inmates.

The Correctional Journals for Hualupai Control **(Addendum D1)**, Dorm 1 **(Addendum E1)**, Dorm 2 **(Addendum F1)**, and Perimeter **(Addendum G1)** were obtained and reviewed. The Correctional Journals listed nothing out of the ordinary.

The Correctional Journals for the perimeter officers list the perimeter was secure during the entire shift for swing shift on July 30, 2010, until the officer (Shannon) was relieved at approximately 2100 hours and up to 2206 hours on Graveyard, when the breach in the fence was reported by Officer Labbe between zones 9 and 10.

Information provided by officers who have worked the perimeter indicate the officers are instructed to patrol the perimeter in one direction at no more than 5 MPH (Miles Per Hour), and if an alarm is activated, they are to go all the way around the perimeter, until they arrive to the zone activated.

In addition, the officers reported they are directed not to utilize the turn arounds in order to clear a zone as soon as possible, and not to increase their speed when responding to a zone alarm, observations of the perimeters during the AIU Investigators visit to ASP-Kingman confirmed the information provided by the officers was true and accurate, and the time it takes to get around the entire perimeter without any delays was approximately 10 minutes.

Information obtained in the course of the investigation indicates inmates McCluskey, Renwick, and Province escaped from the facility between 2004 hours, and 2115 hours, on July 30, 2010.

Based on the information the Graveyard officer should have completed six to seven rotations around the perimeter between 2004 hours and 2100 hours prior to being relieved of duty, and the graveyard officer should have completed one to two complete rotations around the perimeter upon arriving on shift.

Note: The perimeter vehicles are not equipped with any type of alley lights, or spot light to assist the officers when clearing the zones, and several officers indicated they are instructed to patrol the perimeter with their windows up to avoid having their weapons taken.

The post orders for Lieutenant, Sergeant, Control Room Officer, Dorm Officers, and Perimeter were obtained and reviewed, at a minimum several written directives were not followed regarding sound correctional practices, and are listed as follows:

Lieutenant **(Addendum H1)**

013.05 In the daily requirements of your position, you shall:

- 1.1 During tour of duty, the Shift Commander is directly responsible for the safety, security, and welfare of the overall facility.
- 1.3 Make decisions, which affect the secure/ orderly operation of the facility.
- 1.8 Exercise sound judgment in evaluation situations, making decisions, and issuing orders.

013.05 Supervisory Task:

- 1.7 Ensure vehicles entering or leaving the secure perimeter are escorted, providing on the spot supervision and support when necessary.

013.12 Security Device Inspections:

- 1.1 Ensure that each officer assigned to a post conducts a security device inspection once per shift, and it is reported to Control for documentation into the Correctional Service Log.
- 1.2 Ensure that an information Report, AC Form # 105-2p, and a Maintenance Work Order Request is submitted for any and all security devices needing repair.

Sergeant: **(Addendum I1)**

014.05 In the daily requirements of your position, you shall

- 1.12 Ensure a security inspection of the perimeter is completed daily with special attention to security or the perimeter fence and gates

014.11 Security Device Inspections:

- 1.1 Shall be completed at least one time per shift for each post and shall be documented in the post correctional service Log.
- 1.2 Complete an Information Report, ADC Form # 400000029, and Maintenance Work Order, request Form # 6007, for any and all security devices needing repair.

Control Room Officer: **(Addendum J1)**

054.04 In the daily requirements of your position, you shall

- 1.2 Conduct an operational test of all Control Room equipment, inventory all equipment and document on the Correctional service log.
- 1.3 Receive/conduct and record all security checks.
- 1.6 Inform shift commander of all abnormal conditions.

054.05 Security Device / Fire/ Safety Inspection:

- 1.1 As defined in Department Order 703, Security/ Facility Inspections, security devices include any apparatus whose function is to restrict entry to or exit from a specific area or location, such as a gate, fence, locking mechanism or alarm system.
- 1.3 At the beginning of shift the Control Room Security Officer shall conduct a security device/fire/safety inspection. The Housing Unit Security Officer shall document in the Correctional Service Log the time the security device inspection began. The name of the staff conducting the inspection, and any identified deficiencies. Prior to documenting request for work orders and related information reports , the pass along log shall be checked to verify the deficiency has not been previously reported.

Dorm Yard Officer: **(Addendum K1)**

052.05 In the daily requirements of your position, you shall

- 1.2 The officer (s) assigned to this post shall monitor and control inmate activity within their assigned POD's of responsibility.
- 1.3 The assigned Dorm/ Yard Officer shall be responsible for all activity such as security, sanitation, maintenance and count that occurs in their assigned Housing Unit.
- 1.5 Each Dorm Officer shall be responsible for insuring that the following tasks are accomplished.
 - 1.5.1 Security device inspection is completed.

Perimeter Security Officer: **(Addendum L1)**

032.04 In the event of an emergency, you shall

- 1.1 Initiate ICS and designate A or B Team Response. Call for back-up by use of a radio or telephone as available. If a problem is of a nature that, in your judgment, can be handled at your level, proceed after notifying Control of your intended actions. Implement ICS procedure as required by policy.
- 1.2 Disturbances/Escapes: Disturbances, i.e. strikes, riots, assaults on staff, the public other inmates, suicides or attempted suicides, escapes or attempted escapes. If any of the above should occur in your area of responsibility keep calm and implement ICS procedure as required by policy.

032.06 In the daily requirements of your position, you shall:

- 1.2 Complete any special duties assigned. You are responsible for the custody and care of inmates in our area. All infractions of rules and regulation shall be properly documented. You shall familiarize yourself with procedures, post orders and policies affecting your area.
- 1.5 Conduct continuous security inspections of the perimeter to ensure compliance with operational directives
 - 1.5.1 These checks shall be conducted in a manner that does not establish a routine pattern.
 - 1.5.2 Close visual inspection of the perimeter fence, gates, locks, perimeter lighting and other security devices shall be conducted. Call in each security check to the Main Control Room for documentation.
 - 1.5.3 Close supervision of vehicles and persons entering the area shall be maintained. Should unauthorized persons or vehicles enter the area, proceed to the area and identify the vehicle or persons from a safe distance. Note the vehicle make, model, license plate number, and/or a description of the person (s) seen. Contact the facility Control Room and relay all pertinent information. Contact the Shift Commander for further instructions.
 - 1.5.5 Any disruption of perimeter sand trap areas must be noted and immediately reported to the Shift Commander.
- 1.7 In the course of roving the facility and grounds, inspect security devices in your area, (i.e., gates, locks, fence, razor wire, lighting, call boxes, doors, etc). Complete an information report and a Maintenance Work Order for any and all security devices needing repair.
 - 1.11.1 Ensure the security of the facility and grounds.

032.07 Security Devices: Shall be conducted at the beginning of each shift and shall include:

- 1.2 Perimeter fence
- 1.3 Razor Wire
- 1.5 Sand Traps

1.11 Any discrepancies found will be immediately reported to the Shift Commander, recorded in your correctional service log and all appropriate documentation forwarded.

The Arizona Department of Corrections Department Order 706, which is referenced in each of the above post orders for MTC (Management Training Corporation), provides the guideline for MTC staff to follow regarding response to emergency situations and tactical priorities.

In section 706.03 1.1 Tactical Priorities, subsection 1.1.1 MTC failed to Provide for the safety, accountability, and welfare of the public, Department Personnel and inmates. Department Order 706 is a restricted policy, and is available upon request for review references any other deficiencies.

A copy of the contract (**Addendum M1**) between ADC and MTC reference the housing of ADC inmates at ASP-Kingman was reviewed.

The results of the review verified in 2002, MTC was awarded a contract by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) to construct and operate a 1,400 bed minimum/medium security prison facility located in Kingman, Arizona.

Partial operation of the prison began in August of 2004, with the arrival of the first 400 inmates. Once construction was completed in early 2005, additional medium custody inmates were moved into the facility.

An e-mail (**Addendum N1**) sent from AIU Investigator Barragan to Denel Pickering Procurement Administrator inquired if the contract states the custody level of inmates to be housed at ASP-Kingman.

Ms. Pickering responded by writing, "Yes the contract amendments identify the negotiations between ADC and MTC under amendment AD9-010-A3," and under these amendments the renegotiations and inclusion of the old existing 1400 bed contract in Kingman 040120DC.

In addition, Amendment 040120DC established the facility accommodate minimum and medium inmates, and when ADC renegotiated the old contract Addendum AD9-010-A3 gave ADC the ability to house minimum or medium custody inmates at ASP-Kingman.

Operations Director, Contract Beds, Wade Woolsey was contacted reference the information provided by Ms. Pickering, and asked what direction is provided to ADC staff reference the job duties as monitors at MTC. Mr. Woolsey indicated Department Order 106 (**Addendum O1**) and the Tech Manual defines the responsibilities for him and all the other monitors at MTC.

A memorandum (**Addendum P1**) from Operations Director Wade Woolsey to Division Director, Robert Patton authorizes the use of Department Order 106 TM to be utilized to monitor the operation procedures for ASP-Kingman under contract beds.

The Tech Manual provides direction for several areas related to the operation of contract beds per the contract to include (**Addendum Q1**) indicates ADC Department Orders which are not applicable to contract beds (**Addendum Q.1.1**), and (**Addendum Q.1.2**) the oversight of private prisons Under Title 41 State Government ARS codes (Arizona Revised Statutes).

The Tech Manual provides detailed guidance to the monitors regarding the duties of ADC staff at the MTC facility, and documents in Chapter A, The Oversight of Contract beds to include, but not limited to making final determination in resolving any non compliance issues.

In addition, the Technical Notes directs each member of the Departments Monitoring Team to be knowledgeable about the terms and conditions of the contract as well as the Department's policies to include Department Orders, and Director's Instructions.

A review of e-mails sent from ADW Lee to Wade Woolsey, and Wade Woolsey to ADW Lee indicate daily communication occurred regarding day to day operation, and previous directives for ADW Lee to submit reports such as 703 Inspection reports were to be stopped at the direction of Operations Director for contract beds Wade Woolsey.

The last Monthly Report submitted by ADW Lee was in October of 2009, and February of 2010 (**Addendum R1**), and neither of the reports indicated any type of problem with the alarm system at ASP-Kingman. In addition, several memorandums (**Addendums S1**) submitted by other monitor team members at ASP-Kingman spanning from April 2009 to June 2010, to ADW Lee indicated no problems with the security alarms or any other areas within the institution.

The PDQ's (Position Description Questionnaire) were reviewed for all the monitor positions at ASP-Kingman to include ADW (**Addendum T1**), Captain (**Addendum T1.1**), and CO III (**Addendum T1.2**). Information obtained in the course of the investigation indicates the monitors were aware of the information provided in the PDQ's which described the duties for each monitor position at ASP-Kingman.

An e-mail (**Addendum U1**) from CIU Investigator Zada Shafer to Lisa Yanez indicates employees do not sign any documentation acknowledging their understanding of their job duties, and that the Operations Director for contract beds meets with his staff and gives them a summary of their duties.

The ADC Engineering Division was contacted in reference to inspections conducted at the ASP-Kingman facility regarding the security requirements of the facility. ADC Ralph Mellecker provided documentation (**Addendum V1**) of the 13 times he conducted inspections at ASP-Kingman.

Mr. Mellecker indicated the inspections he conducted were for the requirements of a minimum security facility. Mr. Mellecker stated he was aware the perimeter fence at the Hualapai unit met the standard for a medium security facility.

Note: Mr. Mellecker reported off tape when his area became aware the ASP-Kingman facility was going to be housing medium security inmates, they were told not to worry about it by the previous ADC Administration to include former Director Dora Schriro, Division Director John Hallahan and Offender Operations Director Charles Goldsmith

A copy of the last audit (**Addendum W1**) conducted at ASP-Kingman was reviewed and indicated 1954 lines of the Contract, Department Orders, Technical Manuals, Institutional Orders, and Post Orders were evaluated, 24 findings were found 11 for ASP-Kingman, and 13 for the Arizona Department of Corrections.

The Criminal Investigations Report from the Arizona Department of Corrections was not finished at the time of this report, however photos were provided of the crime scene on July 31, 2010, at ASP-Kingman (**Addendum X1**).

On August 01, 2010, I/M Renwick was recaptured in Glenwood, Colorado. The U.S. Department of Justice provided a detailed report (**Addendum Y1**) indicating I/M Renwick confirmed himself along with inmates McCluskey and Province did in fact have help from a female accomplice identified as Casslyn Welch, fiancé and first cousin to I/M McCluskey.

The following information does not include the entire text of the individual interviews. Only information which was considered pertinent to the actual incident or of significance is included. The complete digital audio recordings generated from these interviews were submitted to the Records Retention Unit.

ASSOCIATE DEPUTY WARDEN DAVID LEE

On August 13, 2010, at approximately 1118 hours, ADW David Lee was interviewed by Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman. ADW Lee read and signed the complaint advisory (**Addendum A2**).

ADW Lee asked if discussing the current investigation regarded his current chain of command or his chain of command to which he will be reporting to on Monday August 16, 2010. ADW Lee was informed he should have no reason to explain anything to anyone unless it comes from the Director. ADW Lee stated he understood.

ADW Lee stated his present assignment is Associate Deputy Warden, Contract Monitor at ASP-Kingman, which consist of two units, Hualapai and Cerbat. ADW Lee stated he did not remember what hours he worked on July 30, 2010, but recalled he did work. ADW Lee went on to say he planned on doing some work over the weekend, and did not return to Phoenix.

ADW Lee stated, he received a telephone call around 2200 hours or 2230 hours but did not recall who called him, but believed it was ADW Ramsey. ADW Lee stated they have been having problems with the phones in Kingman, and calls get dropped on a regular basis, and he did not recall if he had to call back to get the information, or if he was informed when he received the call regarding the escape.

ADW Lee stated based on being informed of a code 200 in progress, he responded to the institution arriving approximately thirty minutes later. ADW Lee stated he could not say positively what time he arrived, but it had to be in the area of 2230 hours, or so where he was logged into the facility by security.

ADW Lee stated sometime after he was informed of the situation, he called his immediate supervisor Wade Woolsey, Director of Contract Beds by cell phone while he was on his way to the prison.

ADW Lee stated once he arrived at the institution, he received a briefing and was informed three inmates were confirmed to have escaped and the Mohave County Sheriffs Office were already on site attempting to locate the three escaped inmates.

ADW Lee stated he went out to look at the initial site in efforts to find out what happened, and gather information, because he knew his immediate supervisors would be asking for more details regarding the escape.

ADW Lee stated Mr. Woolsey did call him, and directed him to get specific information about each inmate, to include how long they've been at ASP-Kingman, what they were in prison for, and any other relevant information pertaining to each inmate. ADW Lee stated he completed the task as requested utilizing the Adult Management Information System (AIMS).

ADW Lee stated other than providing the information as requested, he did not complete any paperwork as to what his actions were that night of July 30, 2010.

ADW Lee stated his primary duties as contract bed monitor was to ensure MTC is complying with the terms and conditions of the contract as well as ADC policies and procedures.

ADW Lee stated part of his duties was to ensure MTC staff are receiving the proper amount of training before being put on the yard, to include in service training, weapons qualifications, and any other training as directed by ADC.

ADW Lee stated he recalled reviewing OJT (On the Job Training) files for the officers at ASP-Kingman employed by MTC, approximately seven months ago, and about a week ago he was asked by an investigator (name unknown) to pull a file and send him a copy of it, but could not remember the name of the investigator.

ADW Lee stated he did not know what the training curriculum was for the officers at ASP-Kingman off the top of his head, and was asked if he didn't know what the curriculum was, how would he know what he was looking for when reviewing the officers training records.

ADW Lee had no response, but stated he has gone to the classes given to the officers two or two or three times in fourteen months he's been at ASP-Kingman to ensure the training was being conducted correctly.

ADW Lee stated he did discuss the issue of the alarms with the Warden Lieber, but did not believe it was a serious enough issue, to follow up. ADW Lee went on to say, "Gentlemen I know I screwed up, my priorities were not where they should be, I got wrapped up in paperwork, it's not an excuse."

The interview was stopped at 1152 hrs due to ADW Lee asking to take a break. The interview with ADW Lee resumed at 1156 hours.

ADW Lee stated he had never read the entire contract between ADC and MTC, but recalls being told where to find it, but was not sure if he was required to read it.

ADW Lee states he was overwhelmed with the amount of paperwork he was required to complete, and believed he was performing his required duties on a daily basis. ADW Lee stated due to all the movement, grievances, inmate letters, and the disturbance they had at the prison, he was extremely busy which required him to work twelve hour days.

ADW Lee stated he can't think of anything else to cover regarding the incident, and admitted he should have been more attentive to his duties and reiterated when he took over the job in Kingman he wasn't told "squat" about doing the job.

ADW Lee stated when he walked in to his current assignment, he had no examples of how to complete any of the required paperwork, and no files were set up to show him how to do anything else. ADW Lee stated he was never shown the PDQ giving him the job description of his duties.

ADW Lee stated he did not check the post orders for MTC to ensure they mirrored the policies and procedures set forth by ADC, and acknowledged the nine foot fence behind dorm 2 used to exercise the K-9's should have had razor wire on top of the fence, but never voiced his concerns to his immediate supervisor, Wade Woolsey. In addition, ADW Lee stated he did not know what the security requirements were for a minimum / medium facility

ADW Lee stated prior to the escape of the three inmates no issues were brought to his attention regarding any security issues to include the razor wire above the enclosure for the dogs behind dorm 2.

ADW Lee acknowledged he was the "eyes and ears" for the Department and was asked, if he did not read the contract how could he perform his job professionally and completely. ADW Lee stated, "I guess I can't." and advised he was told he had fourteen months to read the contract.

I/M Renwick went on to say he was approached by McCluskey who mastermind the whole plan and asked Renwick a few days before the escape if he wanted in. I/M Renwick reported he accepted his role, and was told to watch the perimeter to determine when would be the best time to make a break for the fence.

I/M Renwick reported it did not take long to estimate the time it took the perimeter officer to make their rounds, and informed I/M McCluskey the best time to make the break would be sometime around 1945 hours.

I/M Renwick reported on the day of the escape all three inmates met up at 1945 hours, but there was a delay in the plan, so he lost track of exactly what time they left the unit. I/M Renwick confirmed I/M McCluskey called Casslyn Welch with a cell phone I/M McCluskey borrowed from an inmate on the yard in prison for drug dealing.

I/M Renwick reported after the phone call was made to Welch, the three men watched the horizon for the arrival of Welch who had tools and weapons to assist with the escape. I/M Renwick reported once they saw Welch they jumped over the 9 foot fence behind dorm 2 and proceeded to the perimeter fence. Welch threw several wire cutters and two handguns over the fence.

I/M Renwick reported it took the three men approximately two minutes to cut the fence and depart the area. I/M Renwick reported once the four got out into the desert area, Welch was unable to recall where she left the vehicle.

I/M Renwick reported they split up in efforts to locate the vehicle; Province went with McCluskey and Welch, and Renwick ventured out on his own. I/M Renwick reported he found the vehicle which was stocked up with supplies and clothing.

I/M Renwick reported he felt like time was running out on him, and left the area without McCluskey, Welch, or Province. I/M Renwick advised he noticed a cell phone on the seat to which he threw out the window once he got on the interstate confirming phone communication did occur between McCluskey and Welch. Further details of the capture of I/M Renwick are available in the report from the U.S Department of Justice.

On August 08, 2010, Inmate Province was arrested by officers from the United States Marshals Service in Meeteetse, Wyoming. Information indicates I/M Province was identified by a citizen who in turn called the authorities. When Province was arrested, he admitted to aiding in the kidnapping of the couple in New Mexico and provided information to depict Welch's participation and indicated McCluskey was the one who shot the couple.

On August 08, 2010, Apache County Sheriff Deputies, Department of Public Safety Officers and US Forestry personnel arrested Welch and McCluskey at a campsite within the Gabaldon Campground, located in Apache County, southwest of Springerville, Arizona. In subsequent interviews, McCluskey and Welch provided information concerning their involvement in the kidnapping of the Haas couple and McCluskey admitted to shooting the couple.

As required by Department Policy, the *Administrative Investigations unit, Escape Investigation Checklist* was completed (**Addendum Z1**).

Because each escape is a failure, investigators **SHALL** examine the circumstances of the escape in detail and report the details objectively and fully to management so that management may identify and address those factors within management's control which contributed to, or allowed an escape.

ADW Lee stated when he discovered something below standards or not according to contract or policy and procedures, he would correct the problem by addressing the issue to MTC Administration, and if the issue still was not resolved, he would submit documentation to his immediate supervisor Wade Woolsey.

ADW Lee stated it was his opinion he did not need to run to his boss every time something happened, and would first try to resolve the situation before getting his immediate supervisor involved by handling the problem himself.

ADW Lee stated he was not aware of the issues with the alarm system, and never walked the entire perimeter to check if the alarm system was working correctly, or if it was even part of his job duties to do so. ADW Lee went on to say, "I'm telling you right now I'm not making excuses, I had one day with my predecessor, Deputy Warden Mary Clark and she didn't tell me squat."

ADW Lee stated he learned recently as a result of this escape he was required to walk the zones. ADW Lee stated he walked the inside perimeter but not as much as he should have, and went on to say he has never actually set off the alarms to see how it works. ADW Lee stated he assumed if there were issues someone would of mentioned something, but nothing was ever said about the zones".

ADW Lee stated he has never gone into the control room to observe how the zones are called out to the perimeter, or how they are cleared when activated, but recalls watching an officer checking the zones approximately a month before the escape.

ADW Lee stated he knew the zones were buried in the ground, and the vibration from a person walking on them would set them off. ADW Lee stated he was aware MTC administration would purchase dirt and put it over the cables when the weather conditions would blow away the dirt, or the rain would wash it away, but did not know it was a major issue.

ADW Lee stated he attends the daily meeting with the staff from MTC, and if he was not available, he would send one of his staff who included Captain Weaver or CO III Taylor from the Cerbat unit, or Captain Green or CO III Anderson from the Hualapai unit.

ADW Lee stated during his time as ADW at ASP-Kingman the issue of the alarm system has never been brought to his attention by MTC staff, and he did not recall ever being told anything from his ADC staff regarding any issues with the alarms.

ADW Lee stated at times when he worked late he noticed several zone lights activated for no apparent reason, but believed it was normal activity for the zones. ADW stated his understanding of the lights turning on was because a zone was activated, and should be cleared by the perimeter officer. ADW Lee stated he has noticed during the summer months the zone activations appear to be more active, but again never thought anything of it.

ADW Lee stated as a regular occurrence it would be a deficiency in the operation of this institution, and he should have completed documentation to Mr. Woolsey. ADW Lee stated he has never made any type of notification to Mr. Woolsey or reported any deficiencies regarding the alarm system.

ADW Lee was informed in the course of the investigation, it was understood some doors were left open to allow access to the dog area behind Dorm 2 for the inmates who were handling the dogs. ADW Lee stated he was not aware of this information, and the inmates should have never had that type of access.

ADW Lee was asked if he had not read the contract completely how could he know what violations or what parts of the contract are not being adhered to by MTC. ADW Lee stated, "I guess I can't,"

ADW Lee was asked about people walking on the perimeter to include inmates. ADW Lee stated inmates are usually escorted except today he observed inmates walking without escorts only "eyeball to eyeball" (visually watched). ADW Lee stated he did not bring that issue to anyone's attention until now (1247 hrs).

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 1248 hours.

OPERATIONS DIRECTOR, CONTRACT BEDS, WADE WOOLSEY

On August 13, 2010, at approximately 1300 hours AIU Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan conducted an interview with Operations Director, Contract Beds, Wade Woolsey at ASP-Kingman.

Mr. Woolsey stated he had been the Operations Director, Contract Beds for approximately two years, and ADW Lee was his monitor at the ASP-Kingman facility for the past sixteen months.

Mr. Woolsey stated he was not aware of any deficiencies with the operations in the institution operated by MTC, and if there were problems, or deficiency, a report would be completed. Mr. Woolsey stated the monitor would submit a memo to him (Woolsey), he would review it, and set up a meeting with the vender, MTC to resolve the issue. Mr. Woolsey stated if the vender failed to correct the issue he (Woolsey) would go to D. Pickering, the Chief Procurement Officer at ADC.

Mr. Woolsey stated he would visit the Kingman facility once a month, and "nothing was glaring" regarding the running of the unit by the ADW or other monitors. Mr. Woolsey was informed of the information obtained concerning the issue with the alarm system, and he stated he was not aware of any problems concerning the alarm system at ASP-Kingman.

Mr. Woolsey stated ADW Lee never addressed any issues concerning the alarm system with him, and as a matter of fact he had a conversation with ADW Lee the day after the incident regarding security procedures when he arrived at Kingman, but nothing was mentioned about the alarm system.

Mr. Woolsey stated when he arrived; he took ADW Lee and another staff member (not identified) on a walk around the facility and asked what they saw. Mr. Woolsey stated after being given input from ADW Lee and the other staff member, he critiqued their observations. Mr. Woolsey stated it was clear ADW Lee was not seeing the broad picture, and had a very narrow view regarding the security of the institution to include, the razor wire over the dog enclosure and the alarm systems. Mr. Woolsey went on to say he was not sure ADW Lee knew the alarm system was down.

Mr. Woolsey stated it is part of ADW Lee's job description to ensure the security of this facility is in compliance with ADC policy and procedures and if not, ADW Lee was to make notifications to him (Woolsey). Mr. Woolsey stated it is also part of the contract compliance that MTC comply with the terms and agreements to include policy, procedures and protocols of ADC.

Mr. Woolsey stated all his monitors are given a copy of the contract, and were given direction to read, understand and comply with the contract. In addition, Mr. Woolsey stated ADW Lee was given specific direction to comply with all directives listed in the contract.

Mr. Woolsey stated every employee that's been hired since he's been here, meets with him (Woolsey) prior to going to their assignment. Mr. Woolsey stated he gives each employee an outline of their duties and responsibilities, and tells them the contract is available on the K drive, J drive, online, and copies are here (his office) and the vender has a copy as well.

Mr. Woolsey stated, if any of the monitors have questions they are told to pick the phone up and call him, and they all have his home phone number as well as his Blackberry number.

Mr. Woolsey stated ADW Lee has never contacted him for clarification on what he (Woolsey) would consider a serious breach in the vender contract.

Mr. Woolsey stated when he arrived at ASP-Kingman after the escape on July 31, 2010, himself and ADW Lee walked around the facility, at which time Mr. Woolsey was able to point out some deficiencies which he (ADW Lee) should have seen long ago and most certainly prior to his (Woolsey's) arrival.

Mr. Woolsey stated there were old maintenance tool cages behind the building, which haven't been used for years, and questioned ADW Lee at to why they were still there. Mr. Woolsey stated he told ADW Lee the cages could be used as an avenue for an inmate to jump on and throw something onto the roof or from the roof down onto the perimeter.

Mr. Woolsey cited another example of the washout at the sweat lodge where the Native American inmates wash themselves after sweating, and asked ADW Lee Why wouldn't we concrete this? Mr. Woolsey stated ADW Lee should have walked the area and took a vender employee with him whether it was the Chief of Security, ADW or the Warden, to point out any deficiencies which may be a concern.

Mr. Woolsey stated to his knowledge until he took his walk with ADW Lee, he was not aware if ADW Lee had walked the facility upon his appointment as monitor.

Mr. Woolsey stated he was surprised ADW Lee did not know there was a issue with the alarm system at Kingman, because it doesn't take a twenty year veteran to look out and see all the lights turning on, and the lights don't just turn on unless something sets them off such as an animal crossing the sensor, weather conditions, or even poor maintenance of the alarm system. Mr. Woolsey stated it leads him to believe ADW Lee didn't know about the alarm system, because he was not checking.

Mr. Woolsey was told ADW Lee was not aware of an issue with no razor wire on the enclosure for the dogs behind dorm 2. Mr. Woolsey stated, "You're not aware if you don't go out and look at it." Mr. Woolsey said the first thing he noticed was there was no razor wire.

Mr. Woolsey was informed of information ADW Lee was told about inmates being visually escorted from CERBAT to their worksite. Mr. Woolsey stated the issue should have been immediacy addressed, and if not resolved elevated to his level.

Mr. Woolsey stated in the sixteen months ADW Lee has been at ASP-Kingman, he is sure on the spot corrections were addressed, and was sure ADW Lee advised him of the corrections, but could not recall any of the on the spot corrections he was made aware of. Mr. Woolsey stated an ADW is put into the position to observe and take corrective action for any deficiencies, and believed that is what was happening at ASP- Kingman with ADW Lee.

Mr. Woolsey stated ADW Lee was required to walk the yards, and go into the dorms to see if they were in compliance, and if any changes occurred regarding policy and procedures, those changes were posted in the dorms. In addition ADW Lee should have had a working knowledge of what the post orders said.

Mr. Woolsey stated one of ADW Lee's other duties was to ensure the training at ASP-Kingman was in compliance with ADC policy. Mr. Woolsey was not aware the last time ADW Lee checked any records of any type.

Mr. Woolsey stated you would think any person in the position of ADW would go pull five to ten random files to determine if they are filed properly, and were complete. Mr. Woolsey stated a check of such records could include classification, visitation etc, and if not, that person could take corrective action.

Mr. Woolsey stated every Monday he checks the CO III's 95 screens looking at their classification actions and requires them to tell him if they are behind in discipline because he (Woolsey) could roll one of his DHO's anywhere in the State to assist, but if he's not aware of the situation, he can only presume they are handling their business.

Mr. Woolsey stated at no time did ADW Lee request assistance because he was overwhelmed in any particular area. Mr. Woolsey stated he offered all his monitors his personal attention "twenty-four seven," and told them he did not care what time of the day it was, his phone number is not a secret. Mr. Woolsey stated his standard rule is if it is six o'clock he's probably home, so call the land line. On the weekends if you call his house and the answering machine picks up call the Blackberry immediately, that means he's away from the house.

Mr. Woolsey stated they have had peer audits at ASP-Kingman where they received deficiencies for visitation, files out of compliance, and emergency key set improperly color coated or marked. Mr. Woolsey stated when the unit receives a deficiency they have to do a plan of action and we do follow ups.

Mr. Woolsey stated ADW Lee reviews the audit and forwards a copy to him (Woolsey) who in turn provides a copy to the Warden of the contract facility. The auditors conduct a debriefing every day with the facility administration and gives them the opportunity to make any on the spot corrections.

Mr. Woolsey stated since coming to ASP-Kingman after this incident and walking around, many deficiencies have been reduced to written form to the vender for correction. Mr. Woolsey stated they have been given a time frame to correct any deficiencies out of the Director's office.

Mr. Woolsey stated the ADW is required to oversee the training of MTC staff to make sure they comply with the contract, and should be aware of the curriculum, because it is the same as COTA. Mr. Woolsey stated the ADW should sit in on classes to make sure the curriculum is being followed for contract compliance.

Mr. Woolsey stated he did not feel ADW Lee was fulfilling his duties as required by his position, and was absolutely "flabbergasted." Mr. Woolsey stated he asked ADW Lee what he is not seeing. ADW Lee responded by saying he was buried in paperwork to which Mr. Woolsey asked what does that mean.

Mr. Woolsey stated ADW Lee told him (Woolsey) of a report he was directed to complete along with his normal duties, and asked which task he wanted completed first. Mr. Woolsey stated he questioned ADW Lee's time management skills, and was told by ADW Lee, "I get it I'll do it to the best I can." Mr. Woolsey stated he talked to his supervisor, Mr. Patton, about the conversation he had with ADW Lee, and was told he (Patton) was not buying it.

Mr. Woolsey stated he told ADW Lee his problem was his time management and organization skills, because he (Woolsey) watched chow being served, walked through three buildings, and was still able to complete his normal duties to include clearing all the paperwork off his (Lee's) desk.

Mr. Woolsey stated he asked ADW Lee if he was having trouble managing his time or prioritizing things. ADW Lee responded, "I'm swamped." Mr. Woolsey stated prior to this conversation ADW Lee had never expressed to him he was overwhelmed.

Mr. Woolsey stated he was not able to address the issue with ADW Lee being overwhelmed, because he was not aware ADW Lee was feeling overwhelmed or swamped. Mr. Woolsey went on to say he talks with ADW Lee constantly on an everyday basis and asked what he can do to help.

Mr. Woolsey stated he sat down with ADW Lee and told him his duties would be contract compliance first and if he had questions bring them to him (Woolsey), to include reading the contract.

Mr. Woolsey stated ADW Lee knew when ASP-Kingman finished the addition the total inmates would be 3,508 total inmates. Mr. Woolsey stated he talked to ADW Lee about sending him to CMA, CAA to better his skill and advised him to network with his peers.

This portion of the tape was concluded at 1357 hours. The tape was restarted at 1357 hours at which time the interview was continued. Mr. Woolsey was asked if the three inmates who escaped were properly classified to the Kingman facility. Mr. Woolsey said yes to his knowledge.

The interview was concluded at 1359 hours.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER III MELISSA ANDERSON

On August 13, 2010 at approximately 1409 hours, an interview was conducted with Correctional Officer III Melissa Anderson at ASP-Kingman. CO III Anderson read and signed the Administrative Investigations Complaint Advisory form (**Addendum A2**).

CO III Anderson was advised the investigation was in reference to the Kingman escape. CO III Anderson stated she had been assigned to work at the Kingman facility since December of 2009, and ADW David Lee had been her supervisor for the past year. CO III Anderson stated her job duties consisted of: classification, grievances, contractual audits, some policy issues and anything the Captain requested.

CO III Anderson was asked if she was involved in reviewing the classification of the three inmates who had escaped to ensure they were properly classified to this institution. CO III Anderson stated hadn't looked them up and didn't know, but eventually said yes.

CO III Anderson stated she didn't recall having any contact with the three inmates who escaped, due to the large volume of inmates who approached her on the yard, and explained these inmates had not arrived at Hualapai until they started opening for the mediums in May of 2010. CO III Anderson stated she was supposed to review everything that came in, but she had been covering both units and the case managers had helped out in reviewing the files.

CO III Anderson was asked if she had reviewed AIMS to see if she made any comments on their classification screens. CO III Anderson stated she did review Renwick's file to see if he had a life sentence and she did review their visitor information to assist the CIU Investigators on the case.

CO III Anderson was asked if she was aware of any security issues and advised the alarms were occasionally activated by the wind. CO III Anderson stated she had walked the perimeter during a pre-audit, approximately a year ago on the grave yard shift. CO III Anderson explained, during this time they (the monitors) came in on all the shifts and walked the perimeter with an officer to make sure there were no foot prints and to ensure the alarms and the lights went off, which they did.

CO III Anderson was asked if she was in compliance with her training and she replied, "No," she still needed her CPR/CARE class.

CO III Anderson stated in reference to classification there was no process in place to double-check the custody level of the inmates who came into that facility prior to their arrival; unless for some reason she received information about a particular inmate, then she would ensure the inmate was absolutely classified to be on the yard. CO III Anderson stated other than that she didn't see the inmates until they got them.

CO III Anderson stated when she did classification, she had to go pull their file and check things. She clarified, if she had an issue she would call central office, unless she had the time to do it manually, but she hasn't had to do it manually, sometimes she just called and asked. She further stated she had sent some inmates back and re-classed them because they weren't supposed to be there. She added this happened "Quite a bit" because they had been "Over-ridden" to come there. CO III Anderson stated if this was done manually they would qualify to be there, but before the policy changed they didn't. She further stated classification was "Event driven."

CO III Anderson advised the classification process was done prior to the inmate's arrival there, but if there was a question, she brought it to Mr. Lee's attention and then they would determine if they needed to be re-classed and sent out on the next bus.

No other questions were asked; the interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 1428 hours.

CAPTAIN JUDI GREEN

On August 13, 2010, at approximately 1427 hours, Captain Judi Green was interviewed by AIU Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman.

Captain Green stated she has been a Captain since April of 2010, having been promoted at ASP-Kingman, as part of the ADC monitoring team. Capt. Green stated she previously worked at ASPC-Lewis Complex as a Lieutenant.

Capt. Green reported her immediate supervisor is ADW Lee, and her first day at ASP-Kingman was April 26, 2010. Capt. Green stated her primary duties include Disciplinary Hearing Officer, but lately she has also been doing the job as Disciplinary Hearing Coordinator which sets up hearings for the Captain. Capt. Green stated in regards to hearing disciplinary cases, herself and the Captain from CERBAT listen to each other cases reference disciplinary issues.

Capt. Green stated in addition to the jobs she previously mentioned, she also conducts hearings on 805's, regarding inmates who are requesting protection.

Capt. Green stated she is involved in the audit process when there is non-compliance of security issues with MTC staff, and usually it is handled through the ADW. Capt. Green stated in some cases, she is able to resolve minor issues, for example, when an officer forgets to close a gate, she recommends an on the spot correction.

Capt. Green stated she was not aware the alarm system was not working properly, and believed the system was not much different from what she was familiar with at ADC prisons where wildlife might set it off or, it would go off for no apparent reason. Capt. Green stated she did not know what physical differences there were between Kingman's and Lewis's alarm systems except that Kingman's had buried cables and not microwave.

Capt. Green stated she had not fully read the contract with the vendor (for prison operations), but has read pieces of it relating to disciplinary issues. Capt. Green stated she did not know if she was required to read the entire contract, and was not directed by ADW Lee to read the contract.

Capt. Green stated she was not specifically directed to monitor areas for compliance regarding security, procedures, but if she observed anything against policy she would address it. Capt. Green stated she was never told by ADW Lee part of her duties included the monitoring of the training of officers working for MTC.

Capt. Green stated ADW Lee never discussed serious violations with contract compliance with her and other than what was previously discussed regarding minor on the spot corrections, she was not aware of any serious security violations which would have been elevated to the Warden's level.

Capt. Green stated her shifts were consistently day shift and she had not been required to cover any swing or graveyard shifts. Capt. Green stated she was going to work this weekend but did not know if that would be continuing.

Capt. Green stated regarding security checks, part of her job was to do detention walks and make rounds within the facility, and once again if she observed MTC staff failing to perform their duties correctly, she would address it.

Capt. Green stated when she initially arrived to ASP-Kingman she took a tour of the yard and observed the unit to be very clean compared to ASPC-Lewis, and noticed certain things like there was no erosion around the fences.

Capt. Green stated she did not think of looking for things like structural changes or where more razor wire would be needed, but acknowledged she should have since Level 3 inmates were being moved in from the Cerbat unit.

Capt. Green stated she recalled taking a tour of the pod where the dogs were kept, but did not venture outside the pod area. Capt. Green stated if she had gone outside, she wasn't sure if the fence not having razor wire on top of the 9 foot fence would have been something she would have addressed, or be alarmed about because the outer fencing was something she considered normal.

Capt. Green stated she was aware rocks were used to prop doors open when the pen was being cleaned, but had only found out about this practice on the day of the incident.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 1447 hours.

OFFICER DAVID WARD

On August 13, 2010, at approximately 1647 hours, Officer David Ward was interviewed by AIU Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman.

Officer Ward stated he was working Hualapai Control on July 30, 2010, on swing shift. Officer Ward was shown an Information Report he wrote, and acknowledged the report was his, and everything in it was true and accurate. Officer Ward stated since the incident nothing has triggered any memories of anything he left out of the report.

Office Ward stated he had already left shift when the Code 200 occurred, and nothing unusual happened prior to his leaving. Officer Ward stated he arrived to work on the day of the incident at 1300 hours and left at approximately 2105-2110 hours.

Office Ward stated issues with alarms occur every night, and on that night, lights had been going on and off all night. Office Ward stated it had rained earlier that day, and for some reason when it rains the alarms seem to be more active. Officer Ward stated he would reset the alarms, but as soon as they were reset, they would go off again.

Officer Ward stated at one point all 14 zones went off at the same time and stayed on, and he did not send the perimeter officer to check the zone. Officer Ward stated after he reset the alarms, he was not sure if they reset, or went off again. Officer Ward stated it was busy in Hualapai control that day, and he was training Officer Weaver at the time and he did not pay attention to which zones were going off after he reset them.

Officer Ward stated after the rain, he could not recall if he reset the alarms, but he probably did and had perimeter go around to clear the alarms. Officer Ward stated he did not know if the alarms were reset or were tripped because the alarms were always going off and being reset, and he would not notify the perimeter every time a zone was activated.

Officer Ward was asked if more than one zone goes off, did he notify the perimeter officer. Officer Ward stated if five zones go off at one time, as it had done today, he notified perimeter but he could not remember everything about that night. Officer Ward stated they had just begun logging the alarms, and when a zone goes off, he would sometimes notify the perimeter, or if it was near the officers hourly check, he would wait for the officer to call in all secure, and clear the zone.

Officer Ward was asked if he recalled the activity of the alarms at approximately 2005 hours on the day of the incident, and if he notified the perimeter officer. Officer Ward stated the alarms were going off continuously, and if it was near the time the perimeter officer was going to call in his/ her hourly secure perimeter check, he did not send the perimeter officer to every activation, because the perimeter should have cleared the zone on his/ her check.

Officer Ward was asked if there was ever a time where the alarm was activated and the lights did not go on. Officer Ward stated more so this week because they were "stepping it up" and perimeter vehicles were calling in to report zones going off when it wasn't showing on his control panel.

Officer Ward stated he did not remember any instances of a zone light going on and it not showing up on his control panel prior to the escape, but the night before the escape zone 12 zone light was going on every minute.

Officer Ward was asked on the night of the escape approximately how many times did the alarms go off before he stopped resetting them. Officer Ward stated he didn't know or count the times, nor did he know approximately what time he stopped, but it would have to of been close to the end of his shift.

Officer Ward stated he did not know if the Administration, Sergeants, etc. were aware of the issues with the alarms, but he never said anything, because it was common for the alarms to go off. Officer Ward stated in casual conversation it would be brought up, but nothing in writing.

Officer Ward stated in the two months he's worked Hualapai control, the alarm system has never been turned off because they were going off so much, and he did not know how to turn the system off. Officer Ward went on to say, when an alarm is activated, he generally resets it within 20 minutes.

Office Ward stated he did not train the new person on the alarms and had him on cameras and taking calls by staff wanting gates opened. Officer Ward stated his duties included being aware of the camera system, the phones, the alarm system, issuing keys, radios, and verifying anyone entering or exiting the unit. Officer Ward stated the control room is usually a two person post.

Officer Ward stated over the last two months, officer Schroeder and Fitch had worked with him in the control room, and officer Schroeder was the officer who trained him in the control room. Officer Ward stated he couldn't remember if Schroeder told him to not reset the alarms until the perimeter cleared the zone.

Officer Ward claimed he did not know what happened to print out sheets of alarms going off, but just recently the officers received directives to include the sheets with their nightly paperwork, and he (Ward) admits to not logging all the alarms going off, because he was too busy with other duties in the control room.

Officer Ward stated he did not notify his Sergeant with the problems the alarms were having, because everybody knew about the alarms. Officer Ward stated he was never given any direction from his Sergeant or Lieutenant to write work orders to maintenance or IT, or even to write an information report regarding the alarm system.

Officer Ward stated he noticed a couple of weeks ago a procedure sheet above the alarms to call perimeter every time an alarm goes off and have the perimeter clear it. The question was clarified about alarms constantly going off. Officer Ward stated he was not aware of any protocol to deal with the issue such as calling maintenance or the Lieutenant to put out extra officers because all the alarms were going off.

Officer Ward was asked if he was aware of how the alarm system got turned off for more than an hour and sixteen minutes, and was off by forty two minutes on the night of July 30, 2010. Officer Ward stated he had no idea how to log off the alarm system, and the only buttons he uses to clear an alarm are the F2 and F4.

Officer Ward stated he was not aware the computer clock was off by 42 minutes or how it happened because he always used the clock by his monitor. CO II Ward was asked if he was familiar with his post order, and stated he has read and signed off on the post orders.

Officer Ward stated he attended a six week academy prior to working in the unit, and one week OJT after the academy.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 1710 hours.

LIEUTENANT DAVID HEPPLER

On August 13, 2010, at 1711 hours, Lt. David Heppler was interviewed by AIU Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman.

Lt. Heppler stated he was assigned as swing shift commander on the night of the escape, and nothing occurred out of the ordinary. Lt. Heppler stated he was not aware of any issues with the alarm system on the night of the incident, but the alarm system was an ongoing problem.

Lt. Heppler stated the alarm system goes off 2 or 3 hundred times a shift, and each time the perimeter officer goes to each zones to check for security and integrity. Lt. Heppler stated once the perimeter clears the zone, the zone is reset.

Lt. Heppler stated he was not aware of any standard practice of not resetting the alarms because they were continually going off, and recalled submitting a fire inspection requested to IT or maintenance to look at the alarm system two and a half years ago.

Lt. Heppler stated the alarms have been an ongoing problem for the past two and a half years, and since becoming a Lieutenant, he notified ADW Ramsey of the problem when he was the Chief of Security as the Major. Lt. Heppler stated he did not notify Capt. Smith who was the current Chief of Security.

Lt. Heppler did not know if Capt. Smith was aware of the problem, because Capt. Smith used to be an Administration Lieutenant, and he had no reason to talk to him. Lt. Heppler stated he had not talked to Capt. Smith about the alarm issue because it was an ongoing problem and thought everyone above him was aware of the issues. Lt. Heppler stated he only knew of the people in his chain of command being aware of the issue when he was a Sergeant.

Lt. Heppler acknowledged as a shift Lieutenant, he was responsible for everything which occurs during his shift to include the completion of information reports, making sure deficiencies are reported and completed by CO's and Sergeants.

Lt. Heppler stated it was maintenance error in the way the cable was installed which allows monsoons to wash away the dirt and exposing the cable sensors, or the wind or butterflies flying over the dirt causing false alarms. Lt. Heppler stated if you keep crying wolf, sooner or later the wolf is going to get you.

Lt. Heppler stated he was not aware of how long it would take to replace the dirt on the cable sensors when it was discovered to have been eroded from the elements, but believed it was the responsibility of the Chief of Security.

Lt. Heppler stated the zone checks on the perimeter were done every night by graveyard shift, and he was not sure if graveyard was aware of the alarm problem, but he assumed they were. Lt. Heppler stated the problem was fixed only with a "band-aid," by throwing dirt on top and a contactor should have been called out to determine how it is installed incorrectly and bury the cable deeper.

Lt. Heppler stated the procedure of the Main Control officers on his shift was when an alarm is activated, notify and dispatch the perimeter officer to the zone each and every time an alarm goes off, document the activation in their logs.

Lt. Heppler stated however there were a substantial amount of new officers who had not been trained and brought up to speed, but part of their post orders in Hualapai control was to log everything.

Lt. Heppler stated part of his duties as the shift Lieutenant is to check the correctional journals during his shift. Lt. Heppler stated when he went into main control and noticed the officers were not logging all the alarms activated, he would ask the officers why, and then follow MTC's procedure for discipline of employees.

Lt. Heppler stated although he has not had to discipline any of the control room officers, he does not review the alarm sheets and he was not aware if alarm sheets had been discussed in administration meetings.

Lt. Heppler stated there was no rainstorm on his shift the night of the escape, but the alarms were active and he did not check the journal in the control. Lt. Heppler stated he was not aware there was a major problem with the alarm system.

Lt. Heppler stated he was aware of a contingency plan if the alarms would not reset, and advised he would have a second perimeter officer out on the perimeter until the situation could be resolved along with documentation in the form of a SIR, but that has not happened.

Lt. Heppler stated he was not aware the alarm system was off for a period of time on the night of the escape, and was surprised to hear the system was off for an hour and 16 minutes because no one ever made him aware of it.

Lt. Heppler stated he didn't believe control room officers would have any knowledge on how to turn the alarm system off, because he didn't know how to reset or turn it off himself. Lt. Heppler was asked, if the officers have to sign on at the beginning of each shift, because the print out shows the system was logged off by the operator. Lt. Heppler stated the officers do not have to log in when they arrive to the worksite.

Lt. Heppler stated the control room officers are not directed to contact their supervisor if something goes beyond just constantly resetting the alarm system, and they are only following what is directed by their post orders.

Lt. Heppler stated he was required to make rounds and review logs, but he didn't remember signing the log that night.

Lt. Heppler was asked if control room officers had a problem with alarms going off, did he have a protocol to get additional help in the control room to monitor the system. Lt. Heppler stated he couldn't take someone off another post to help out per the contract.

Lt. Heppler stated he was not aware and it was not an accepted practice for the officers working main control to reset the alarms with out having the perimeter officer clearing the zone.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 1731 hours.

OFFICER BERNARD WEAVER

On August 13, 2010 at approximately 1810 hours, Officer Bernard Weaver was interviewed by investigators Barragan and Brodner from the ADC at ASP-Kingman.

Officer Weaver stated he had only been working at the prison ninety days and was currently assigned and trained in the area of the Core position outside the dorm, but was also being trained to work in the dorm.

Officer Weaver stated on the night of the escape, he was assigned to Hualapai control, and it had only been his second day in the control room. Officer Weaver stated his duties were to monitor the camera and doors in front of him.

Officer Weaver stated he noticed the alarms were going on and off all night, even after they were reset, but he did not think it was unusual, because the first time he worked in the control room all the lights on the control panel were lit up all the time.

Officer Weaver stated the weather conditions that night were clear, although he thought they had received rain earlier that day, and both him and Officer Ward were working the alarm board, because he (Weaver) was not familiar with the alarm system. Officer Weaver stated the red lights were active from the time he entered the control room, to the time they left, and he would tell Officer Ward when the lights came on so he could reset them.

Officer Weaver stated the standard practice when an alarm continued to go off wasn't discussed, but he noticed they seemed to be going off all the time, even after being reset. Officer Weaver stated he didn't have much to do with the running of the control room that night, but could see Officer Ward was occupied with the radio, phones, keys and guns for the majority of the time. Officer Weaver stated, in his opinion, he believed the control room to be a three person post.

Officer Weaver was asked if the Lieutenant came in that night. He said he thought he remembered him coming in "Twice" once early in his shift and then once later, but he didn't say anything to him about the alarms and he didn't hear the other officer say anything either.

Officer Weaver stated he worked an eight hour shift in the control room, but wasn't aware of how many times the alarms went off that night, because when they were reset it seemed they immediately came back on. Officer Weaver stated his primary duty was not to monitor the alarm panel, but when he would look in the direction of the panel, it seemed like all the zones were active.

Officer Weaver stated earlier in the day (around 4:00/1600 hours) they had a storm, and the alarm screen went down. He mentioned it to Officer Ward, who told him it would come back up. Officer Weaver stated he didn't know if it was because of the rain, but the screen went dark and he saw a "computer thing" down below.

Officer Weaver stated this was a "tough situation" and looking back, working the control room, probably more discussion should have happened, instead of just being in that position doing the job. Officer Weaver stated he did not notify a supervisor, and was not sure if Officer Ward did, and was not aware if any documentation was completed regarding the alarm system going down. Officer Weaver stated he couldn't recall how long the screen was dark.

Officer Weaver stated he had been a "Boss" for thirty years, but the control room was very busy and stressful, and just trying to "Keep it together" listening to the radio and watching the camera monitor to open doors for people going in and out, he wasn't paying close attention to alarm monitor. Officer Weaver stated he had worked the control room two times prior and never noticed the system go down, but didn't question Officer Ward about it.

Officer Weaver stated he had worked the perimeter "Quite a few times" and noticed the zone lights would turn on, and as soon as he would clear the zone and the control room officer would reset them, the light would come back on. Officer Weaver stated he was told to drive the entire perimeter when clearing a zone.

Officer Weaver stated it took him approximately [REDACTED] minutes to drive around the perimeter, and if a zone alarm was going off, he would speed up to check the zone. Officer Weaver stated when he checked a zone, he would look for "Everything" to include, footprints, fence damage, inmate movement, vehicles, animals, clothing, blood or anything at all as he was taught in the academy and OJT.

Officer Weaver stated he was trained to travel in the same direction while patrolling the perimeter, although he sometimes changed his speeds and swung into the parking lot and looped around that and the warehouse and turned into the turn-outs. He said he was trained and directed to travel in a counter-clockwise direction, but he didn't remember reading that in the post orders.

The interview concluded at approximately 1828 hours.

OFFICER RUTH ANZALONE

On August 13, 2010 at approximately 1908 hours, Investigators Barragan and Brodeur interviewed Officer Ruth Anzalone at ASP-Kingman.

Officer Anzalone stated she was on duty on July 30, 2010, and worked the swing shift from one to nine (1300-2100 hours) assigned to dorm one as the floor officer. Officer Anzalone stated nothing out of the ordinary happened that night and no reports were written.

Officer Anzalone stated she didn't hear about the escape until her brother called her the following day, who is also employed at ASP-Kingman, and told her he had heard about it on the news and called her before she went to work that day.

The interview concluded at approximately 1910 hours.

OFFICER JOHN PALMER

On August 13, 2010 at approximately 1921 hours, Officer John Palmer was interviewed by Investigators Barragan and Brodeur at ASP-Kingman.

Officer Palmer stated he had been an officer since March 26, 2010, and was on duty on July 30, 2010, assigned as the dorm 2. Officer Palmer stated nothing occurred that night to indicate anything was wrong, and he was not familiar with the inmates who escaped, but felt if he saw them, he would recognize them.

Officer Palmer stated he saw I/M Province throughout the day because he was housed in that dorm they kept the dog program in, but didn't recall having any contact with McCluskey or with Renwick. Officer Palmer stated he submitted a five page information report at the request of Warden Lieder.

Officer Palmer stated an announcement was made on the yard that the yard was closed, so he exited the dorm and went out to the yard to ensure the inmates who were still out on the yard were making their way in to the dorm. Officer Palmer stated the intercom was not working, so he had to shout the announcement inside the pods, and started securing doors.

Officer Palmer stated as usual after securing doors he would always get inmates knocking on the door after he secured it, because they got locked in the wrong pod, and he (Palmer) would have to let them into their right pods.

Officer Palmer stated he recalled an inmate requesting to take his dog outside to use the restroom, but denied the inmate access to the area behind dorm 2, because the unit was getting ready for the 2115 hours formal count. Officer Palmer stated after securing all the doors, he continued with grabbing medical requests and passing out any paperwork which needed to be distributed before he left for the day.

Palmer was asked if he had ever seen the inmates put rocks in the doors to keep the doors open and he said he had, but not after lock down, because they secured the doors themselves and if they found a rock, they kicked it out and secured the door.

Officer Palmer stated the inmates use rocks during the day to allow air circulation in the pod, and were not allowed to prop the front door of the pod open, because other inmates who were not in the dog program were not suppose to be in the pod. These doors could be controlled / popped from the control room, but they did not have keys to override the electronics. When they came on shift these doors were open and stayed open until lockdown at night.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 1929 hours.

OFFICER CHRISTOPHER DAY

On August 13, 2010, at 1948 hours, Christopher Day was interviewed by AIU Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP- Kingman.

Officer Day stated he has worked as an officer at ASP- Kingman since March 8, 2010, and on the day of the escape he was assigned to Dorm 2 as the chow officer. Officer Day stated his day was routine regarding his duties to include conducting mail call, medical slips and security checks.

Officer Day stated he knew two of the escaped inmates by sight: Renwick from 1-Baker-5 dorm1 and Province, whom he called "Providence" from Dorm 2. Officer Day stated on the day of the escape during the 1600 hour count, he did not see Renwick and McCluskey, because he wasn't in Dorm 1 but did recall seeing Province earlier in the day when he first arrived to work.

Officer Day stated as a dorm officer, he was aware the back door leading out from the pod where the K-9's were kept in dorm 2 was left open during the day, but claims he never saw the door propped open with rocks.

Officer Day stated he has worked as the control room officer in the pod, and was aware the door leading out the back could be placed on override allowing inmates access to the area where the dogs are taken to use the restroom, but after the yard is closed, the door can only be accessed by Dorm 2 control; the tower; and Hualapai (main) control. Officer Day stated all three control rooms could override doors so they could be shut and not locked.

Officer Day stated the control room in the dorm does not have an audible alarm identifying a door is open, and the only way an officer would know if a door was open, is if the officer flipped thru two or three screens which shows if a door was open. Officer Day confirmed the doors remain open until the yard is locked down at 1600 hours for count and 2045 hours, prior to the relief by Graveyard.

Officer Day stated the secondary officer would "flip flop" and verify if doors were shut by going over to the secondary screen and make sure they were green. Once verified, whichever officer was checking the doors would go back to the dog pods and verify the doors were secured and nobody was still out in the enclosed area.

Officer Day acknowledged after the 1600 hour count cleared and the yard is opened, and the door to the dogs are behind Dorm 2 is reopened, and stays open to approximately 2045 hours.

Officer Day stated he was not asked to write a report regarding that night's activity until Sunday, and clarified he had originally written his report on a plain sheet of paper then later re-wrote it on an Incident Report formatted sheet as a supplement.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 0956 hours.

OFFICER PHILLIP SHANNON

On August 13, 2010, at approximately 2011 hours, Officer Phillip Shannon was interviewed by ADC Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan.

Officer Shannon stated he has been employed at ASP-Kingman since May 3, 2010, as an officer. On July 30, 2010, he was assigned as perimeter officer from 1300-2100 hours.

Officer Shannon stated the alarms were going off non-stop throughout the facility but he wouldn't know for sure because he was on the perimeter. Officer Shannon stated what he meant about being on the perimeter was the zone lights come on sometimes without being activated in the control room.

Officer Shannon stated the night he worked the perimeter was the first time he had worked a full shift on perimeter, and had only worked four hours on the perimeter prior to that with no training.

Officer Shannon stated he was aware, if a zone was activated, he was to respond to the area, clear the zone and notify Hualapai control when the zone was cleared.

Officer Shannon stated when he came upon a zone light he would check the fence, the ground in front of the fence, and the area in the no-man's land between the perimeter fence and the barbed wire fence to make sure there was no activity.

Officer Shannon stated he was told by other officers when on perimeter, not to drive with his windows down because of the weapons in the vehicle and generally would not roll down the windows. Officer Shannon stated he had nothing to illuminate the ground to check for tracks to include a flashlight or spotlight in the truck.

Officer Shannon stated if he did find any kind of tracks to include animal tracks, he would rake them out, and if the inmates had escaped on his shift, he would have absolutely seen footprints or a breach in the fence.

Officer Shannon stated he was told to travel in one direction when on perimeter and not to use the turn arounds when responding to a zone. Officer Shannon stated he would put his vehicle in the lowest gear and allow the vehicle to travel at the speed of the vehicle at that gear. Officer Shannon stated he estimated the perimeter to be approximately four miles, because it takes him between [REDACTED] minutes to get around the perimeter.

Officer Shannon stated he logs all the zones he is contacted to clear, and very rarely does he stop to get out of his vehicle, and on the night of the incident, he saw nothing unusual.

Officer Shannon stated if the perimeter was breached prior to him leaving shift, he would be absolutely surprised, because the yard closed at 2045 and he slowed down to watch an officer on the east yard rounding up inmates. Officer Shannon stated he was able to see between Dorms 2 and 3 looking at the fence the entire time.

Officer Shannon stated he believed the door behind dorm 2 was open prior to 2045 hours, but could not be sure, and felt the inmates would have had to leave before 2045 hours and there's no way he could have missed a breach in the fence. Officer Shannon stated he had 13 years experience and was very observant.

Officer Shannon stated he previously worked for the Sheriff's Departments in California and Lake Havasu PD, but acknowledged he had not worked in corrections at a facility with a perimeter, and indicated the five week academy and the limited OJT was lacking in showing him all the duties related to working the perimeter.

Officer Shannon stated he has worked in Hualapai Control approximately five or six times, and was not aware of officers resetting the alarms without having the perimeter check the zone first. Officer Shannon stated the first time he worked in the control room; he was not trained on zone alarms, and was told to concentrate on the cameras and doors.

Officer Shannon stated after monitoring the doors for awhile another officer to which he could not recall showed him the zone alarm panel telling him if an alarm goes off, call perimeter patrol and have them check it before resetting the zone, and log the activity in your log, Officer Shannon stated again in all the times he's worked in the control room, he has never seen any officer just reset the alarms with out having the perimeter officer clear the zone first.

Officer Shannon stated he has observed perimeter officers clear a zone and seconds later when the zone was reactivated, repeat to main control the zone was clear, because they had just cleared it.

Officer Shannon stated it all depends on who the officer on the perimeter is as well, because some officers will clear the zone, and others will go all the way around the perimeter, before clearing the zone which would take approximately [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] minutes depending on how fast they were driving and where they were on the perimeter.

Officer Shannon stated in the times he has worked control he would estimate zone alarms going off anywhere between 100 to 150 times, for all the zones, and on an eight hour shift, they usually went off less than five minutes between each activation. Officer Shannon stated he would log all zones activations along with the time perimeter cleared the zone, and if it happened again seconds later, he would do the repeat the same procedure.

Officer Shannon stated there was slight rain on the day of the incident, and he wasn't sure if it affected the alarms going off, but recalled he did not get many calls from Hualapai Control to check zones. Officer Shannon stated when did get called for a zone, he would let control know the zone was clear, but did not log it in his journal, because control was supposed to log it in their log.

Officer Shannon stated he hoped he could continue working at the prison and reiterated it was hard for him to believe a breach occurred while he was on perimeter and knew the officer who relieved him also did a perimeter check and confirmed the perimeter was secure.

Officer Shannon stated he had talked to the graveyard officer (not identified) from the day of the incident, and was told after the officer dropped him (Shannon) off, he went through the parking lot, parked and checked the oil in the truck, wrote in his log, and went around to do a perimeter check clearing the perimeter as secure at approximately 2113 hours.

Officer Shannon stated he had heard from other officers, at the 2115 hour count, the officers couldn't clear the Dorm 1 count and were told to recount, and upon still not being able to clear their count, Sgt. Bussart was sent to dorm 1 to assist, when dorm 2 officers called in reporting their count could not clear as well.

Officer Shannon stated it was his understanding at that point an ICS was activated, because an A team and B team were called to search buildings, and the perimeter officer was told to check the areas behind Dorms 2 and 3.

Officer Shannon stated when he talked to the officer on graveyard (not identified), he was told, he checked the perimeter fence again, and that's when he found the hole in the fence and tools on the ground. Officer Shannon stated he was also aware the perimeter officer stopped a vehicle on the perimeter to which the driver claimed to be lost.

Officer Shannon stated some officers were saying the vehicle on the perimeter was a distraction, while other were saying it was just a lost driver on the perimeter. Officer Shannon stated the officer told him he had gone around the perimeter at least twice prior to being stopped but another rumor was the officer on the perimeter went by the area twice and didn't find the hole until the third time around, but the officer told Officer Shannon he found it the first time.

Officer Shannon stated he felt he was very security conscious, and wondered why the dog enclosure and sweat lodge did not have razor wire on top of the fences, but then asked himself, where could they go.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 2048.

OFFICER SCOTT HENRY

On August 13, 2010 at 2134 hours, Officer Scott Henry was interviewed by ADC Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman. Officer Henry stated he had been employed with MTC since December 16, 2008, and was working on July 30, 2010, assigned as the Dorm II Officer.

Officer Henry stated nothing unusual happened during the shift until count was conducted at 2115 hours, and three inmates were not accounted for. Officer Henry stated he did not conduct the count in any of the pods where the inmates were missing, but was aware recounts of the pods were being completed.

Officer Henry stated he recalled Officer Esquville coming into the control room saying I/M Province was missing out of Dog pod, and called the sally port officer to see if I/M Province was at the sally port, who reported he was not there, and assumed I/M Province was in medical. Officer Henry stated Officer Esquville went back into C pod, and found I/M Province's ID on his buck, which was not there when he did his original count.

Officer Henry stated he called in count, and was told the count was off in Charlie Pod, and to recount the pod. Officer Henry stated they recounted the pod, and I/M Province was still missing.

Officer Henry stated while everything was going on in dorm 2, he could hear on the radio Sgt. Bussart had gone to Dorm 1, because they were having trouble with their count. Officer Henry stated he called Sgt. Bussart on the phone, and was told to report his findings to Lt. Ogle.

Officer Henry stated at approximately 2155 hours, an ICS was called and Officer Esquville was called out of the unit to respond. Officer Henry stated he remained in the control room, until he was given a directive to gather I/M Province's belongings from C Pod. Officer Henry stated Office Miller from the CERBAT unit helped him gather I/M Province's property, take it to the control room, and inventory it. Officer Henry stated after they inventoried I/M Province's property, Officer Abbot came with a cart, and took it to the Administration Building.

Officer Henry stated he remained in the dorm in the control room until a count was done sometime around 0100 hours, which cleared at approximately 0218 hours, showing three inmates missing. Officer Henry stated they did not do an emergency count, but maybe that's why they did a count at 0100 hours, because their normal count times on graveyard are 0200 hours, and 0400 hours.

Officer Henry stated until the unit became aware there was a problem with the count, he did not come out of the control room, and when he arrived to his job assignment in the control room, he immediately checked to see if the front door and the door leading out from B Pod and C Pod were secure.

Officer Henry stated he recalled seeing I/M Province during the evening, but he thought it was kind of weird that when they were having problems clearing the count I/M Province was not at his bunk, and he found that to be very unusual, because all the times before that, I/M Province would always be sitting on his bunk during counts.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 2143 hours.

OFFICER SHERICE HONSE

On August 13, 2010, at 2134 hours, Officer Sherice Honse was interviewed by ADC Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman. Office Honse stated she had been an officer at ASP-Kingman for approximately two month's, and was working on July 30, 2010, as a dorm officer in dorm 1.

Officer Honse stated during the 2115 hour count two inmates were discovered missing. Officer Honse stated as she was conducting her count she went into D Pod and discovered I/M McCluskey was not at his bunk. Officer Honse stated she asked other inmates in the area, if they knew where McCluskey was, and was told by one of the inmates, he was out on a work crew.

Officer Honse stated she knew I/M McCluskey could not be on a work crew, and checked in the restroom area to see if he was in there. Officer Honse stated she was not able to locate I/M McCluskey anywhere, and recounted the pod again with the same results of one inmate missing.

Officer Honse stated after she recounted her pod she came out of D Pod, met with Office Ripley who was counting the other pods. Officer Honse stated she told Officer Ripley she was missing one inmate, and identified the inmate as I/M McCluskey. Officer Honse stated it was during this time Officer Ripley informed her, he was also missing an inmate out of B Pod, identified as I/M Renwick.

Officer Honse stated the two officers recounted their pods, and looked in the unaffected pods to make sure neither one of the inmates accidentally got locked in the wrong pod with negative results.

Officer Honse stated she called Lt. Ogle informing her she did not think their count was going to clear because they were missing one. Officer Honse stated she initially thought they were only missing one, because I/M McCluskey's ID was not on his bunk, and she assumed he was on an out count.

Officer Honse stated she called in her count telling Lt. Ogle she believed I/M McCluskey may be out on an out count, and was informed by Lt. Ogle, there were no inmates on any out counts. Officer Honse stated she was directed to recount the pods. Officer Honse stated herself and Officer Ripley recounted the pod again, and came up with the same information, two inmates were missing.

Officer Honse stated after checking the pods again, and calling Lt. Ogle, she was given a directive to check the showers and all the pods in the dorm in efforts to locate the missing inmates. Officer Honse stated they checked all the areas as directed with negative results. Officer Honse stated Lt. Ogle told her she was going to send Sgt. Bussart to the dorm to assist with locating the inmates, but before Sgt. Bussart could do anything an ICS was initiated.

Officer Honse stated because of the ICS, Officer Ripley left the unit because he was part of the A/B team response, which put her in the control room with no dorm officer. Officer Honse stated Sgt. Bussart later directed her to roll up, inventory, and take I/M McCluskey's property to the control room. Officer Honse stated she completed the task as directed.

Officer Honse stated as she was getting ready to gather I/M Renwick's property two officers from the CERBAT unit came in the unit, gathered his property and put it in the control room. Officer Honse stated a short time later she was directed to take the shoes of inmates McCluskey and Renwick to the sally port to give to the Sheriff's Office. Officer Honse stated as she was returning back to dorm 1, she was given a directive to relieve Officer Torres for the remainder of the shift, and that's where she finished her shift for the day.

Officer Honse stated the day before the incident she recalled interacting with I/M McCluskey during the 0400 hour count, because he was coming out of the showers during count, and she told him he needed to be at his bunk during count. Officer Honse stated I/M McCluskey told her he was sorry.

Officer Honse stated she submitted an information report of her activities during her shift on the day of the incident. The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 2222 hours.

OFFICER CHRISTOPHER GOULD

On August 13, 2010, at 1228 hours, Officer Christopher Gould was interviewed by ADC Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman. Officer Gould stated he had been a Officer about six months and on July 30, 2010, he was assigned to Hualapai (main) control starting at 2100 hours.

Officer Gould stated one of his first duties upon arriving to shift at 2100 hours, is to conduct a count at 2115 hours, and when it was realized three inmates were missing another count was conducted at approximately 0100 hours to determine the total number of inmates at the ASP-Kingman.

Officer Gould stated he did not leave the control room that night, and submitted an information report related to observing a blue sedan circling the perimeter while he was in the control room. Officer Gould stated he saw perimeter officer Labbe stop the vehicle to determine as to why the vehicle was on the perimeter road.

Officer Gould indicated Officer Labbe advised main control a female was identified as driving the blue sedan, and claimed to be lost. Officer Gould stated he made note of the license plate from the video camera and documented the information in his report.

Officer Gould stated after the initial incident of three inmates missing, his only job was to ensure the facility kept moving and operations going without problems. With regard to alarms, Officer Gould stated when he came in at 2100 hours, the only alarm going off was Zone 13, which he notified perimeter, who cleared the zone as all clear and he (Gould) then cleared the alarm manually.

Officer Gould stated when the perimeter officer later discovered the breach in the perimeter fence; he (Gould) turned all the zone lights on to see if anyone was on the perimeter. Officer Gould stated the officer who discovered the breach in the fence was Officer Labbe, and the Shift Commander for the shift was Lt. Ogle.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 2233 hours.

LIEUTENANT SHERRI OGLE

On August 13, 2010, at 2236 hours, Lt. Sherri Ogle was interviewed by ADC Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman. Lt. Ogle stated she retired from CDC after 17 years and had been at ASP-Kingman for four months. Originally she was on graveyard shift about two months but was now on relief.

Lt. Ogle stated on July 30, 2010, during the 2115 hour count, it was discovered three inmates were missing from the institution, and count could not clear. Lt. Ogle stated she had already figured out she had an escape, because at 2130 hours the dorm officers still had not called in their counts, and she knew something was wrong.

Lt. Ogle stated the officers from dorm 1 and 2 eventually called in their counts reporting 1 inmate identified as I/M Province was missing out of dorm 2, and inmates McCluskey and Renwick were missing out of dorm 1.

Lt. Ogle stated she directed Officer Honse in dorm 2 to recount her unit, and Officer Henry in dorm 1 to recount his unit. Lt. Ogle stated when the two officers called back indicating they were missing the same number of inmates as indicated in their first count, she had a bad feeling and called medical to make sure no inmates were in medical.

Lt. Ogle stated she directed Officer Hynick conduct a search of the kitchen to make sure no inmates were in that area, and was informed by Officer Hynick the kitchen was clear. Lt. Ogle stated she contacted her perimeter officer identified as Officer Labbe telling him she suspected an escape in progress, and needed him to go around the perimeter checking for clothing, footprints, anything which would indicate a breach in security.

Lt. Ogle stated when she contacted Officer Labbe; he acknowledged her directives telling her it would be about 15 to 20 minutes before he could follow her directive without any explanation as to why it would take him so long to follow her directive. Lt. Ogle stated she became upset with Officer Labbe and directed him to do it now. Lt. Ogle stated she did not understand why Officer Labbe told her it would take him 15 to 20 minutes before he could conduct the check, and the only other previous problems she ever had with Officer Labbe was to advise him not to drive on the perimeter so fast.

Lt. Ogle stated a short time later she contacted Officer Labbe on the perimeter with an update on the integrity of the fence line, and was advised by Officer Labbe the perimeter was secure. Lt. Ogle stated with the information provided by Officer Labbe, it lead her to believe the inmates were still in the secure perimeter of the institution, and directed Sgt. Bussart to go to the dorms to assist the officers in locating the missing inmates.

Lt. Ogle stated between 2145 and 2150 hours, she called Hualapai control advising them of her suspicions and initiated an ICS without using the word 'escape,' Lt. Ogle stated she figured the inmates were still inside the secure perimeter.

Lt. Ogle stated she had one officer from every dorm meet her at Gate 16, telling them what was going on and started sending them out in teams to search. Two officers were sent to the outside behind pods 3 & 4 and another team between 1 & 2.

Lt. Ogle stated she was in the process of deploying a second perimeter truck, instructed an officer to pull escape fliers and called Lieutenant Kibby from the CERBAT unit to assist with notifications and other duties. Lt. Ogle stated she called Mr. Ramsey (the ADW for MTC) informing him she attempted to call Warden Lieder with negative results leaving a message. Lt. Ogle stated she instructed Officer Mink to run 20 escape fliers and pull escape procedures.

Lt. Ogle stated while all the activity and calls were going on, the perimeter officer, Labbe called on the radio informing her there was a breach in the fence. Lt. Ogle stated from the time she received information from Officer Labbe stating the perimeter was all secure and the call indicating there was a breach in the fence was approximately 7 to 10 minutes.

Lt. Ogle stated she was later informed by Officer Phillips there were tools at the site of the breach in the fence to include pliers and wire cutters. Lt. Ogle stated Officer Phillips was one of her officers she had sent to walk the inside of the perimeter, and was not sure if Office Labbe was aware there were tools on the ground.

Lt. Ogle stated she tried to make notifications to Phoenix, but she kept getting calls and radio traffic, and was not able to make the call. Lt. Ogle stated Warden Lieder returned her call and questioned her about what was going on. Lt. Ogle stated she told Warden Lieder she had not made any notifications to Phoenix, because she was trying to get everything else done, and was told by Warden Lieder she would take care of calling Phoenix.

Lt. Ogle stated Warden Lieder arrived at the unit, and drove around the entire perimeter before relieving her (Ogle) of command.

Lt. Ogle stated about the same time Lt. Eyestone arrived on site as the outside agencies took over the scene. Lt. Ogle stated after being relieved by Warden Lieder, she was assigned other duties to include writing reports and completing the SIR.

Lt. Ogle stated she was aware the perimeter officer on the night of the incident ended up quitting on August 08, 2010, and made no reference to her of his intentions. Lt. Ogle stated she was the relief Lieutenant, which covered all three shifts, and knows she told her Sergeant, Officer Labbe will not be placed on perimeter on any of her shifts.

Lt. Ogle stated she was sure as soon as she walked out of the interview, she would remember something she did not tell us, but she did recall during the time all the things were going on she had an officer follow her around with instructions to write everything down.

Lt. Ogle was asked about the zone alarm system and said they constantly go off, but she was not used to them and was more familiar with electrified fences. She said these tend to go off a lot, and it was an every day occurrence.

Lt. Ogle stated graveyard shift does a zone check within the first hour of their shift, and on July 30, 2010, the zones were being completed between 2100 and 2200 hours, and although she did not look at the logs for the zones getting done, she knows they get done with out fail every night.

Lt. Ogle stated the zones are checked by the officers by weaving back and forth between the zones, and a couple of different officers do the checks. Lt. Ogle stated formal count started at 2115 hours which would be the same time the zone checks were being done, but she was not sure of who or when the zones were started.

Lt. Ogle stated she was aware the perimeter patrols always drove in same direction (counterclockwise) without varying their speed, and not using the turnarounds if they passed a zone that was activated, and go all the way around the perimeter to clear the zone.

Lt. Ogle stated she was not sure, but believed it takes the officers [REDACTED] to get around the perimeter to check a zone, and the only time they are not constantly moving is if they are called to meet with staff or supervisors for various reasons.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 2304 hours.

OFFICER RICHARD RIPLEY

On August 13, 2010, at 2335 hours, Officer Richard Ripley was interviewed by AIU Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP- Kingman. Officer Ripley stated he has been an officer on and off for the past ten years and has worked at the ASP-Kingman since February 2010.

Officer Ripley stated On July 30, 2010, he was assigned to Dorm 1 and conducted count pods A, B, or C where I/M Renwick was discovered missing during the 2115 hour count. Officer Ripley stated he heard another officer reported inmates missing from D pod, while he was conducting his count, and confirmed his dorm was also missing inmates.

Officer Ripley stated Sgt. Bussart arrived in Dorm 1, and they recounted the entire pod again confirming the inmates were missing. Officer Ripley stated an ICS was called and he was directed to report to Gate 16 where an A and B team was being assembled.

Officer Ripley stated with the help of Sgt. Bussart, the Chapel, Administration area, and surrounding rooms were searched with negative results. Officer Ripley stated, he was then directed to report as an additional perimeter where he saw the hole in the fence, five sets of pliers and a lot of law enforcement including DPS and two Sheriff's cars.

Officer Ripley stated he stayed on the perimeter while the law enforcement officers went out and began tracking until 10:30 hours the following morning, and was not asked to submit any kind of documentation. Officer Ripley stated he primary duty while posted on the perimeter was to protect the crime scene, and documenting law enforcement coming in and out of the area.

The interview was ended on August 13, 2010, at approximately 2339 hours.

OFFICER JOSEPH ESQUVILLE

On August 13, 2010 at approximately 2356 hours, Officer Joseph Esquville was interview by ADC Investigators Russ Brodner and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman.

Officer Esquville stated he had been employed at ASP-Kingman for approximately two months and had no previous corrections experience prior to completing his training there at the institution.

Officer Esquville stated on July 30, 2010, he was assigned to work Dorm 2, and on the night of the incident during the 2115 hour formal count an inmate was discovered missing. Officer Esquville stated he originally marked the inmate out as being on an out count because the inmate was not at his assigned area at the time of the count.

Officer Esquville stated his count was called in and determined to be wrong, so he went back to the bunk identified at I/M Province's bed and found the inmates ID on the bench/locker next to the other ID. Officer Esquville stated he asked other inmates in the area where I/M Province was and was told they didn't know anything.

Officer Esquville clarified an X on the count sheet indicated the inmate was in, an O indicated the inmate was out, and a V indicated the bed was vacant. Officer Esquville stated he marked both an X and O on his count sheet, because he was confused regarding the whereabouts of I/M Province.

Officer Esquville stated when the ICS was called, he responded to the area of the shift commander as a B team responder, and upon his arrival was directed by Lt. Ogle to start checking doors behind the dorms with another officer. Officer Esquville stated as he was checking doors behind the dorms the perimeter officer called on the radio stating there was a hole in the fence at zone 9.

Officer Esquville stated himself and the officer he was with went to that area, but did not get any closer than 30 to 40 feet from the breach in the fence on the inside of the perimeter. Officer Esquville stated the perimeter officer was on the outside of the breach in the fence standing outside his vehicle. Officer Esquville stated he did not touch or remove anything from the area.

Officer Esquville stated he saw a hole cut out of the fence with five to six pairs of blue and red handled wire cutters on both sides of the fence, along with two plastic bags which appeared to have blood on them, on the inside of the fence near the razor wire. Officer Esquville stated he saw marks in the sand, but it was dark, so he couldn't tell if they were foot prints, and a dog leash holding the razor wire open at the breach in the fence.

Officer Esquville stated he was called to the shift commander's area where he was directed to get armed and post on zone 7 on the outer perimeter.

Officer Esquville stated he remained at that post until he was relieved at approximately 0500 hours. Officer Esquville stated he did not complete any paperwork, because he was not asked to.

Interview was ended on August 14, 2010, at approximately 0005 hours.

SERGEANT RICKY BUSSART

On August 14, 2010, at 0105 hours, Sgt. Ricky Bussart was interviewed by AIU Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan at ASP-Kingman.

Sgt. Bussart stated on the night of July 30, 2010, he was the shift Sergeant, and became aware of an alleged escape which turned out to be a confirmed escape of three inmates. Sgt. Bussart stated a hole in the fence was found by Zone 9 and 10, and he was not aware of what building the missing inmates were from, but allegedly they came out of Dorm 2. Sgt. Bussart stated the formal count they were doing at 2115 hours did not clear and an ICS was called.

Sgt. Bussart stated when he heard from Lieutenant Ogle inmates were missing, he went over to Dorm 1, and when he was in Dorm 1, he got a call there were inmates missing from Dorm 2.

Sgt. Bussart stated he performed duties as assigned by ICS commander Lt. Ogle, working both inside and outside the secure perimeter of the fence. Sgt. Bussart stated at one point he went to the site where the breach in the fence was, and walked around from the pedestrian sally port over to Zone 9 & 10 on the perimeter road, also up on the hillside by the cattle fence, but not crossing the road to the actual hole in the fence.

Sgt. Bussart stated he was not close enough to see if there was anything around the area of the hole, and was called back inside the facility to complete duties as directed by Lt. Ogle and the Warden.

Sgt. Bussart stated he talked to a Sheriff's Deputy about being up on the hill, when the Deputy asked him to see the bottom of his boots so he could compare them to the footprints found. In addition the Deputy asked him for samples of the types of shoes the inmates could have been wearing, which Sgt. Bussart supplied him, two of the three examples.

The interview was ended on August 14, 2010, at approximately 0112 hours.

MTC ASSOCIATE DEPUTY WARDEN RICHARD RAMSEY

On August 18, 2010, at approximately 1103 hours, Investigator Brodeur from the ADC Administrative Investigation Unit interviewed ADW Richard Ramsey via telephone reference the escape of three inmates from the Kingman facility on July 30, 2010.

ADW Ramsey was informed, it was brought to the attention of ADC, that he (Ramsey) was the Chief of Security, prior to being promoted to ADW, and was asked if he was aware of any problems with the alarm system during the time he was Chief of Security.

ADW Ramsey confirmed he was the Chief of Security from approximately July 2005 to November of 2009. ADW Ramsey recalls the security of the fence system had the same type of problems they (ASP – Kingman) are experiencing now.

ADW Ramsey stated when he was the Chief of Security one of his responsibilities was to purchase dirt to refill the areas covering the alarm cable. ADW Ramsey stated there has been a problem with the alarm system periodically going off which required them to haul dirt in to cover the cable.

ADW Ramsey stated at the time of this interview ASP-Kingman was in the process of having the contractor (Senstar) for the alarm system evaluate the system, and give recommendations to remedy any faults. Investigator Brodeur requested a copy of the report when completed. ADW Ramsey indicated he, would follow his chain of command, but did not anticipate any problems with ADC receiving a copy (a copy was received via fax).

ADW Ramsey stated they have purchased and replaced approximately 250-300 tons of dirt to cover the alarm system cable. The issues with the alarms activating, according to ADW Ramsey seemed to have increase over the last year, and have gotten worse with more false alarms.

ADW Ramsey was asked if any maintenance requests were submitted reference the alarms going off or the need for more dirt. ADW Ramsey stated no, he orders the dirt from a vender with the best price when needed. ADW Ramsey stated the current price for dirt is \$29.00 a ton, and ASP-Kingman has 600 tons of dirt on site as needed.

ADW Ramsey was asked if there had been any discussion concerning the dog area and putting wire on the top of the nine foot fence which enclosed the area. ADW Ramsey said in April 2010, he recommended the dog area not be touched until the population of inmates had stabilized.

ADW Ramsey stated the reasoning for waiting until the population of inmates stabilized was, because in April of 2010, they were swapping the medium custody inmates from the Cerbat Unit to Hualapai Unit, and the minimum inmates from Hualapai to Cerbat.

ADW Ramsey stated the dog program would remain in tact uninterrupted, and suggested to wait until the population settled down and reevaluate what to do with the dog program once the population gets settled.

ADW Ramsey was asked, from the time the medium custody inmates were moved into the unit in April of 2010, was he aware of any discussions of putting razor wire on top of the 9-foot fence used for the dog program behind Dorm 2. ADW Ramsey stated to the best of his knowledge, he was not aware of any discussions.

The interview was ended on August 18, 2010, at approximately 1113 hours.

JIM PACKER ASSISTANT PHYSICAL PLANT MANAGER

On August 18, 2010, at 1238 hours, AIU Investigator Russ Brodeur conducted a telephonic interview with Assistant Physical Plant Manager Jim Packer who is employed by MTC at ASP-Kingman.

Mr. Packer stated he has been employed with MTC since the facility opened in 2004. Prior to his promotion in January 2010, to his current position he was the Information's Systems Tech for ASP-Kingman. Packer said after he was promoted, Jessie Clipston became the IT person.

Mr. Packer stated the responsibility for the alarm system and any issues related to it would fall under his supervision, and he (Packer) was aware of the number of "nuisance" alarms which go off per day. Mr. Parker was asked if he felt the amount of alarms going off has increased over the years.

Mr. Packer stated the amount of alarms going off per day has not increased over the years, and it depends on the zones. Mr. Packer stated he had a report which showed the amount of times a zone (alarm) goes off in a two week period. Mr. Packer referred to the report which shows the average amount an alarm is activated in a two week span. Mr. Packer stated some zones go off 26 times, others 100 to 300 times.

Mr. Packer went on to explain the activation of alarms could depend on the zone in question, as well as, if inmates were working in the zone, if the staff were doing alarm test, weather conditions. Mr. Packer was asked, if inmates were working raking in a particular zone, would the staff deactivate the zone or not reset the zone. Mr. Packer stated he could not answer the question because that would be an operations issue.

Mr. Packer was asked if there has been an on going issue with the clock on the alarm system being off including the forty-two minutes the night of the escape. Mr. Packer stated the system has an internal clock which would continue to keep time within a slight variation to other clocks which he said is normal. He said he believes the clock is off due to "drifting" which is when the internal clock which is not synchronized to the computer and is using A/C sign waves drifts ten seconds a day which over a two year period would be about thirty minutes. In response to a question asked if he had ever had to reset the clock in the alarm system, Packer said no.

In response to a question, if someone could manually shut the alarms down, Mr. Packer stated there would be a way in which someone could manually shut the alarm system down by shutting the computer down.

Mr. Packer was asked if anyone had the knowledge to do that. Mr. Packer stated they could shut off the computer which would shut off the alarm system however they could not stop it from logging the event, and when the computer came back up, it would log it as being rebooted with a date and time.

Mr. Packer was asked if he saw the log which showed the forty-two minute difference. The computer show that gap shutting down the computer would not advance or slow down the time.

Mr. Packer stated, he can't remember the last time he worked on the alarm system or the clock but there had been a site survey where a company came out June 30, 2007. In response to what company performed the site survey, Mr. Packer said, he believes the company was Senstar.

Mr. Packer said, he has not had any work orders submitted or reports for the alarm system in the last year. He did say Senstar is currently on site. He mentioned a work order for a log on error which had been received on Jan 2, 2010.

Investigator Brodeur requested Mr. Packer fax him a copy of the report he referred to concerning the average alarm activations in a two week period and a copy of the work order for the log in error. The two items were received by Investigator Brodeur.

The interview was ended on August 18, 2010.

CONSTRUCTION MANAGER, RALPH MELLECKER

On August 16, 2010 at approximately 1335 hours, an interview was conducted with Construction Manager, Ralph Mellecker at the ADC/ Central Office located at 1645 West Jefferson, Phoenix, Arizona. Mr. Mellecker read and signed the Administrative Investigations Complaint Advisory form (**Addendum A2**).

Mr. Mellecker was advised the investigation was in reference to the ASP-Kingman escape, and information was obtained indicating he conducted thirteen or fourteen evaluations and/or inspections of ASP- Kingman. Mr. Mellecker stated he had conducted "New construction inspections".

Mr. Mellecker stated there are two units at the Kingman facility, "Cerbat" and "Hualapai" and he didn't know which one was which, but he knew one was a fourteen-hundred bed unit and the other was a two-thousand bed unit. Mr. Mellecker stated his construction inspections were conducted on the two thousand bed unit (CERBAT).

Mr. Mellecker stated he only went to the fourteen-hundred bed facility at the time of occupancy to verify it met all the requirements for physical plant standards reference ADAG (American's with Disabilities Act Guidelines).

Mr. Mellecker stated when he was at the fourteen-hundred bed facility; he did notice the perimeter fence was designed as a fourteen foot candy cane fence, the building were constructed with solid concrete construction, and an alarm system was in place.

Mr. Mellecker stated as far as he knew the two thousand bed facility was intended to be a DUI and/or a rehabilitation type facility, and clarified he was not involved in the "Physical Plant modifications" if any to the fourteen hundred bed facility to which fell under the authority of Contract beds Administration.

The interview was ended on August 16, 2010, at approximately 1400 hours.

OFFENDER OPERATIONS, DIVISION DIRECTOR ROBERT PATTON

On August 25, 2010, at 1435 hours Investigator Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan conducted an interview was conducted with Offender Operations, Division Director, Robert Patton.

Mr. Patton stated Operations Director Wade Woolsey worked under him, and was directly assigned to him for the past seven months which is when Mr. Patton was promoted to Deputy Director Offender Operations. Mr. Patton stated Mr. Woolsey had been in his position for approximately three years.

Mr. Patton stated Mr. Woolsey was required to provide reports to him on a weekly or monthly basis, and he would meet with Mr. Woolsey every two weeks at which time they would discuss what was going on inside the areas he supervised to include contract beds and protective segregations.

Mr. Patton stated in the meetings he had with Mr. Woolsey they talked about the facility at Kingman, and new facilities opening up. Mr. Patton stated the Kingman Unit had a disturbance, and Mr. Woolsey expressed a concern about moving inmates in, but as far as any security issues regarding the Kingman facility.

Mr. Patton stated Mr. Woolsey never mentioned any concerns or reservations about ADW Lee, and as a matter of fact he (Woolsey) recommended the ADW Lee for promotion.

Mr. Patton stated he had certain expectation of his Operations Director, as well as all staff who work for him to manage their area, keep him informed, and bring any problems or issues to him so we can get them resolved. Mr. Patton stated his responsibility lies with the Director and information flows are critical in these types of roles.

Mr. Patton stated he told Mr. Woolsey, if you're experiencing issues from any of my RODS who supervise the ten prison complexes, Bad news doesn't 't get better with age, brief him right away so we can get it resolved. Mr. Patton stated expected Mr. Woolsey to tour his facilities, maintain contact with his staff, provide them guidance and support, give them the job expectation of what he expects from them and again to brief him regarding any issues.

Mr. Patton stated the policy and tech manual were very clear as to what reports were expected to be completed on a monthly basis, and Mr. Woolsey was aware of the reports, but was not mandated to show him every report that was submitted, and left it up to Mr. Woolsey to determine what information from reports needed to be addressed with him. Mr. Patton stated no issues to the magnitude at ASP-Kingman were ever discussed.

Mr. Patton stated Mr. Woolsey would tour the facility monthly, however on July 31, 2010, when he toured the facility with ADW Lee, he was able to point out security violations and deficiencies he observed just by walking around.

Mr. Patton stated he wished he had done that in his previous tours of the facility, and indicated when he went to the Kingman facility, he was able to find deficiencies within five minutes of being there, and didn't know how they were missed.

Mr. Patton was asked about two monthly 703 reports, one for October 4, 2009, and one for February 5, 2010, and the fact there were no additional reports. Mr. Patton stated he discovered when asking for the same reports, it was apparent for what ever reason, Mr. Woolsey directed these reports to be stopped because they all stopped about the same time.

Mr. Patton stated he had learned from Joe Profiri, who is the new contract monitor, when he asked Mr. Woolsey about the 703 reports; he was told they did not need to be done. Mr. Patton stated that direction never came from him and he was under the impression the 703 reports were being completed as required.

Mr. Patton stated the Kingman facility perimeter zones have not worked for two years and when the Director arrived at ASP-Kingman all the zone were activated. Mr. Patton stated the Kingman facility did not have an alarm contract with a vender, and it had expired two years prior, so it's been two years since the alarms had been serviced. Mr. Patton stated the unit would bring in dirt to cover the buried cables.

Mr. Patton stated he believed last week the alarm company came out, and worked on the system for four days, it was during this time they discovered out of eight sensors in the alarm system, all eight sensors were bad.

Mr. Patton was asked if the Department had a "check and balance system" in place to identify issues at ASP-Kingman. Mr. Patton stated, if you had asked him on July 30, 2010, he would have said yes, a monitor (ADW Lee) was their five days a week and sometime six days a week, eight hours a day, the Operations Director (Mr. Woolsey) was their one to two times a month but ask him on July 31, 2010, he would say we failed.

Mr. Patton stated he believed the ADW and the Operations Director for contract beds were the eyes and ears for him, the Director, and the Department. Mr. Patton stated both the ADW and the Operations Director were aware of the Technical Manual which he felt was very effective in explaining what each of their jobs were.

The interview was ended on August 25, 2010, at approximately 1452 hours.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE OFFICER II JOSEPH PROFIRI

On August 27, 2010, ASO II Joseph Profiri was interviewed by AIU Investigators Russ Brodeur and Ernest Barragan, at the Inspector Generals Office.

Mr. Profiri stated he has been an ASO II since April 12, 2010, originally assigned to Florence West and CACF in Florence, Arizona.

Mr. Profiri stated it was his understanding the media had requested several reports, one being the 703 reports, and he talked with his immediate supervisor, Wade Woolsey, regarding the reports, and was told the reports were no longer being done.

Mr. Profiri stated he did not recall if Mr. Woolsey told him the following information, but he (Profiri) found out later the direction of not doing 703 reports came from the previous administration as a result the increased and decrease staffing in contract beds. Mr. Profiri stated he was not a party to the conversation or had any part in the decisions stopping the 703 reports of being completed.

Mr. Profiri stated he was not aware of any other reports required, and referred to the targeted auditing schedule which gives direction to the contract monitors to conduct monthly audits of two areas within the facility every month according to a schedule. Mr. Profiri stated the only time the targeted audit schedule would not be followed, was if a peer audit was being conducted during that month.

Mr. Profiri went on to say an example of the targeted audit was, one month they might audit key control and ingress and egress into the facility, and the next month visitation DART procedures.

Mr. Profiri stated based on the audits completed, reports were generated regarding the audit along with administrative reports to include capacity reports which was specific to how many inmates programmed, community betterment, and restorative justice which seemed to all start in May of 2010, and in July 2010 they were required to submit WIPP reports specific only to how much WIPP money was spent.

Mr. Profiri stated he met with Wade Woolsey on his first day of employment, but was not given any clear direction as to what his job duties entailed.

Mr. Profiri stated he recalled on his first day, he spent some time processing in getting his ID and other items to be able to start his job duties, and himself and Mr. Woolsey did go the facilities he would supervising, but nothing much was said regarding what his duties were.

Mr. Profiri stated during his time as a monitor he did recall Mr. Woolsey coming to the facility to tour. Mr. Profiri was asked when Mr. Woolsey would tour the facility would he use the tour as a training tool to correct any deficiencies with in the facility.

Mr. Profiri stated when Mr. Woolsey would come to the institution sometimes they would walk the facility and sometimes not, so in his opinion, if he thought Mr. Woolsey used his visits as a training tool, he would have to say no.

Mr. Profiri stated after meeting with Mr. Woolsey, he went to CACF and Florence West the following day where he met with ADW Richard Gabusi to go over his duties, he still did not have a clear understanding of what his job duties were, but was not sure of what questions to ask regarding his new duties.

Mr. Profiri stated in the time he has been in his position he recalls Mr. Woolsey having one meeting where he met with all his monitors, but did not recall ever having any telephonic meeting with Mr. Woolsey.

Mr. Profiri was informed of a report indicating security device inspections being conducted showing no deficiencies. Mr. Profiri stated the report as described was consistent with the monthly audit reports which were maintained by Captain Curt Duggan who in turn provided Offender Operations Division Director Robert Patton with the report as requested.

Mr. Profiri stated Mr. Woolsey never instructed him to read the contract between ADC and the private institutions, and only became aware of the Tech Manual after talking to his peers.

Mr. Profiri stated Mr. Gabusi showed him where the contract was stored on the computer the first day he met with him, and indicated the Tech manual was very enlightening.

The interview was ended on August 27, 2010, at approximately 1254 hours.

SUMMARY

- Inmate's Province, McCluskey, and Renwick were housed at ASP-Kingman, Hualapai unit, All three inmates were properly classified to be housed at ASP-Kingman.
- On July 30, 2010, between the hours of 2004 and 2115 hours, Inmate's Province from Dorm 2, and McCluskey, and Renwick out of Dorm 1 escaped from the secure perimeter of ASP-Kingman.
- The Investigation indicated the perimeter officers on Swing Shift working on July 30, 2010, and the Grave Yard Officer working July 30, 2010 into July 31, 2010, both missed the breach in the fence in the area of zones 9-10.
- The inmates were discovered missing during the 2115 count, and an emergency count was initiated. Lt. Ogle activated ICS and directed the perimeter officer Labbe to confirm the integrity of the perimeter. Additional officers were assigned to search the interior of the facility while other officers were assigned to check the rear of the buildings.
- Initially perimeter Officer Labbe reported the perimeter to be secure, but approximately seven to ten minutes later called Lt. Ogle, reporting a breach in the perimeter fence with tools on the ground.
- The Investigation indicated the inmates receive help from an outside accomplice identified as Casslyn Welch, who provided wire cutters and firearms to assist in the escape.
- All notifications to Administrative staff were completed, and additional officer were requested.
- Mohave County Sheriff's Office and the Arizona Department of Public safety responded to the incident. None of the inmates were found in the immediate area.
- The Investigation indicated the alarm system in place at ASP-Kingman was not working properly, and there had been no contract vendor for the alarm system for two years. In addition the investigation revealed the last time the alarm system was checked was two years prior to the escape.
- The Investigation indicated at times MTC staff ignored the alarms due to the frequency of times they were activated, and would clear the zones with out properly checking them.
- The Investigation indicated the alarm system was logged off for 1 hour and 16 minutes.
- The Investigation indicated the officers were in their duties allowing the inmates to better plan their escape by creating a standard routine of perimeter checks; to include the perimeter officers not using the turn arounds, required to drive in the same direction at all times, not varying their speed, and lack of illumination devices in their vehicles i.e. Flashlight, Spotlights.
- The ADC monitor, ADW David Lee failed to perform his assigned duties as required.
- Operations Director Contract Beds Wade Woolsey failed to perform his duties as required.
- All three inmates were eventually captured and are pending return to the ADC.

OTHER INFORMATION

If additional investigation is requested, please forward a memorandum, in appropriate format, identifying specific issues to be addressed. Return the administrative investigation report with your request.